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Executive Summary
This report is based on a review of the ICT sector in Kenya from a supply side perspective. It was 
undertaken in 2009–2010 but covers the years from 2005–2009 in many instances and is an update 
of a similar review carried out in 2007. This supply-side analysis has alternated over the last few 
years with a demand-side survey of individual and household access and usage.1 The purpose of 
the study is to create a rich evidence base of the ICT sector developments in selected African 
countries to enable comparison of policy outcomes in different countries against national 
strategies and sector performance. 
In Kenya, ICT issues are considered under various pieces of legislation. The most pertinent 
document is the amended Kenya Communications Act 1998 (KCA 1998). The Kenya 
Communications (Amendment) Act 2009 was signed by the President in January 2009. One of the 
key sections is on electronic transactions (e-transactions), which recognises the convergence taking 
place in the digital world. While this convergence is a reality, most of the countries Kenya may be 
competing with, in the area of business process outsourcing (BPO) for example, have stand-alone 
laws that regulate e-transactions. This Act may need to be reviewed to align Kenya with the 
international best practice of creating separate legislation for critical aspects of the ICT sectors, and 
to harmonise with its East African neighbours. Current limitations include not ensuring cross-border 
recognition and enforcement of electronic transactions. 
The KCA Act of 2009 also established a Universal Service Fund under the Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK), but this is yet to be implemented. 
There is also the Freedom of Information Bill, which is still pending. This Bill proposes a Commission 
be established to enforce data privacy and security together with other stakeholders. This report 
recommends the creation of the two pieces of legislation (data protection and freedom of 
information) move in parallel.
The national ICT policy of March 2006 is currently under review. Developments within the sector, 
including increasing convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications, increased need and 
availability of undersea-fibre bandwidth and the economic blueprint (GOK, 2008a) that the policy 
needs to take into account. The landing of the undersea cables – Seacom and The East African 
Marine System (TEAMS) – in 2009 have already had a dramatic affect. The Eastern Africa Submarine 
Cable System (EASSy) is expected to land in 2010. The landing of the cables brought a lot of 
consumer expectations but only quality has improved: the reduction in the cost of retail Internet 
service remains elusive. The Kenyan Government has also invested in building a national fibre 
backbone, referred to as the National Optic Fibre Backbone Infrastructure (NOFBI), which is under 
progress. 
Within this context it is imperative to understand the key institutions that influence ICT policy 
formulation and implementation. They are the Ministry of Information and Communications; 
National Communications Secretariat; Communications Commission of Kenya; the Appeals 
Tribunal; E-government Directorate; Government Information Technology Services; the Kenya ICT 
Board; Parliamentary Committee on Energy, Communications and Public Works; and the 
Monopolies and Prices Commission.
With reference to market structure, the process of migrating to a Unified Licensing Regime started 
in 2007. It involves a regulatory framework that embraces technological convergence and is based 
on the principle of technology neutrality. The first licences under the framework were issued in July 
2008 and 35 licenses had been issued by the end of 2009. 
In terms of market share there were four licensed GSM operators by July 2009: Safaricom; Zain; 
Orange Kenya; and Essar Telecom Kenya (Yu). This is a significant improvement from 2006, where 
only Safaricom and Celtel had rolled out their networks, with all the associated duopolistic anti-
competitive effects. The seven main Internet Service Providers (ISPs) command a large share of the 
Internet clients; they include the Kenya Data Network, AccessKenya and Wananchi online. However, 
the mobile operators have become the largest ISPs with the landing of the undersea bandwidth 
and the use of the unified licence. By January 2010, Safaricom had sold more than 3.5 million 
broadband modems. 
In terms of access to ICT services, fixed-line service has continued to perform poorly with a rapid 
decline in growth. This is possibly due to the dramatic growth in the use of mobile phones. The 
increase in demand for data services, however, has led to an increase in international gateway 
bandwidth. The bandwidth charges to ISPs have been decreasing since 2005 due to increased 
competition after the 22 data carrier operators were licensed as at December 2007. 
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The price of ICT services has decreased in the last three years as the uptake has improved. This can 
be attributed to the entry of more operators in the industry, resulting in a reduction in end-user 
tariffs due to low termination rates, enhancing affordability and increased uptake by a population 
that was not previously served. A key development has been in mobile money transfer products 
such as Safaricom’s M-Pesa and Zain’s Zap.  M-Pesa, for example, had over 5 million customers and 
3400 agents countrywide by July 2009. M-Pesa is considered one of the best global innovations in 
mobile telephony and has made a huge difference to the unbanked population in Kenya. 
This report also includes survey results from various stakeholders on their perceptions of the 
telecommunications regulatory environment. The respondents gave their views on 
interconnection, tariff regulation, quality of service, market entry, access to scare resources, and 
universal services obligations. In general, at least half the respondents in all categories felt the 
various aspects of regulation were highly ineffective. 
The study also has a number of conclusions and recommendations. These include the need to 
create a detailed plan for the new ICT policy implementation aligned to the Kenya Vision 2030. 
There is clearly an overlap in the roles of some of the key institutions, and a need to review the 
framework for the ICT policy formulation and implementation. There are a number of 
recommendations on the need to strengthen the CCK in order to have more autonomy in decision-
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Although the 2009 census results were not available by the time this report was compiled, Kenya’s 
population is estimated to be around 40 million. The real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew from 
2003, when the National Rainbow Coalition took over, until 2007, when it reached the highest for 
decades at 7.1%. Following the post-election violence in 2008, real GDP growth fell to 1.7% in 2008, 
the lowest growth rate recorded since 2003. The economy showed signs of recovery in the first 
quarter of 2009, recording a growth rate of 3.9% compared to a decline of 0.6% in the first quarter 
of 2008. The key economic data is shown in Table 1 below:
Table 1: Key Economic Data
Socio Economic Data
Gross Domestic Product growth 1.7% (2008)
2.0% (2009) 
Provisional 2008 growth rates for real 
GDP Composition by key sectors
3.7% Agriculture 
3.2% Mining and quarrying 
3.8% Manufacturing
3.1% Transport and communications 
8.3% Building and construction
3.7% Real estate, renting and business services
5.8% Education
Total Population 37.2 million (2007)
38.3 million (2008) – provisional
Urbanisation 42% (2005)
Literacy rate 85.1%
Human Development Index 0.541 (2007)
Life expectancy 53 (2006)
Annual average inflation rate 16% (Jan 2009)
8.5% (Jan 2010)
Interest rate Central Bank Rate at 7% (Dec 2009)
Source: Central Bank of Kenya, KIPPRA, CIA Factbook.
The Kenya poverty profile reveals strong regional disparities in the distribution of poverty. Inequality 
in Kenya remains high. The distribution of income, measured by the Gini coefficient1  was estimated 
at 39% in rural areas and 49% for urban areas before political tension following the election at the 
end of 2007. Income disparities in the rural areas have gone down since 1997, while the disparities 
in the urban areas have increased slightly.
Political Overview
Kenya is a democratic and multi-party state. A Grand Coalition Government was sworn in on April 
17, 2008, with Mr Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) as President and Mr Raila Odinga 
of the Orange Democratic Party (ODM) as Prime Minister. The coalition was established under a 
“National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement” with an equally shared portfolio balance between 
PNU and ODM following a political crisis and violence after the announcement of the results of the 
presidential, parliamentary and local government elections of December 2007. The government 
continues to address short-term issues of national reconciliation and resettlement of internally 
displaced persons. Long-term issues, including a new Constitution and other essential reforms, 
have progressed, albeit at a slow pace.
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Study Purpose & Methodology
This study – an update of a similar review carried out in 2007 – was conducted under the 
framework of ResearchICTAfrica (RIA). It reviews the ICT sector in Kenya from the supply-side 
perspective covering five years from 2004/2005 to 2008/2009, where data was available. The 
purpose of the study is to create a rich evidence base of the ICT sector developments in selected 
African countries that will track domestic developments but also allow for comparison of policy 
outcomes in different countries against national strategies and sector performance. 
The study approach is similar to that adopted in the sector review of 2007. The database had the 
following indicators:
• socio-economic indicators;
• fixed-line service indicators;
• mobile telephone service indicators;
• broadband service indicators;
• public phone service indicators;
• government access indicators; and 
• other indicators that do not fall into the above categories.
The data collection involved a review of relevant secondary data, a review of websites of relevant 
organisations, and one-on-one interviews with experts and managers in the ICT sector in both 
public and private institutions. The data collected was analysed and forms the basis of this report. 
The study also includes an assessment of the Telecommunications Regulatory Environment on the 
basis of stakeholders’ perceptions. The informal survey methodology for this was devised by 
LIRNEasia and is merely a snapshot of the sentiment within the industry at a particular moment in 
time. These perceptions, however, are powerful determinants of regulatory risk within the sector 
and can affect investor confidence. Where positive policy and regulatory developments are not 
translating into positive sentiment, regulatory agencies should review the communication 
strategies to ensure that gains are being communicated to stakeholders and the public. Negative 
sentiment should also be swiftly addressed through communication with stakeholders on how 
current problems are to be addressed in the future.
Policy and Regulatory Environment
In Kenya, ICT issues are considered under various pieces of legislation. These include the Kenya 
Communications Act of 1998; the Science and Technology Act, Cap. 250 of 1977; and the Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation Act of 1988. The national ICT policy (The Kenya Gazette, 2006) recognises 
that these Acts are inadequate in dealing with issues of convergence, electronic commerce and e-
Government. It thus also recognises the need for a comprehensive policy, legal and regulatory 
framework in order to:
• support ICT development, investment and application;
• promote competition in the industry where appropriate;
• address issues of privacy, e-security, ICT legislation, cyber crimes, ethical and moral conduct, 
copyrights, intellectual property rights and piracy.
The most influential document regarding ICT legislation and regulation in Kenya has been the 
recently amended Kenya Communications Act 1998 (KCA 1998). The KCA 1998, which repealed the 
Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Act, provides the current framework for regulating the 
communications sector in Kenya. The Act unbundled Kenya Post and Telecommunication into five 
separate entities including Telkom, the fixed line operator; the Postal Corporation of Kenya (Posta); 
the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) as the sector regulator; and the National 
Communications Secretariat (NCS) to advise the government on the adoption of a communication 
policy. It also created an Appeals Tribunal for the purposes of arbitration in cases where disputes 
arise between parties under the KCA 1998.
The Kenya Communications (Amendment) Bill, 2008, which was to amend the Kenya 
Communications Act, 1998, and address some of the challenges cited in the national ICT policy 
document, was passed by parliament in December 2008 and the President signed it into law in 
January 2009. One of the key sections is Part VII, on electronic transactions (e-transactions). In this 
part, the new Act, among other things, gives legal recognition of electronic records; recognises 
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electronic messages as valid for the formation of contracts; and supports the use of electronic 
records and electronic signatures in government and its agencies. The new Act also deals with 
various aspects of ICT and cyber-crimes.
Inclusion of e-transactions in the Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act, 2009, is a great step in 
the right direction. It demonstrates the Ministry of Information and Communications’ (MoIC) 
commitment to e-transactions. By including e-transactions in the converged Act, the Ministry 
rightly recognises the technology convergence that has occurred in the digital world. While this 
convergence is a reality that has been recognised globally, most of the countries Kenya may be 
competing with, in the BPO industry for example, have stand-alone laws that regulate e-
transactions.  A stand-alone law has sufficient detail to address all the areas of e-transactions. The 
practice in other countries has been to create separate e-transaction legislation. Examples include 
South Africa’s Electronic Communication and Transactions Act, 2002; India’s Information Technology 
Act, 2002, amended in 2006; Egypt’s e-Signature Law No. 15/2004; Philippines Electronic Commerce 
Act 8792, 2000; and the Singapore Electronic Transactions Act, 2001. For now, Kenya should use the 
relevant provisions in the Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act, 2009, to spur the growth of 
the BPO sector. However, in future, this Act may need to be reviewed to align Kenya with the 
international best practice of creating separate legislation for critical aspects of the ICT/BPO sectors, 
harmonise with its East African neighbours and the East African Community laws in these sectors, 
and address certain limitations in the Law. These limitations include not ensuring cross-border 
recognition and enforcement of electronic transactions, limited range of cyber-crimes and lack of 
provision for limitation of liability for service providers (intermediaries) for third party content 
despite the agency involved in e-transactions.
There is also the Freedom of Information Bill, which if enacted, will, among other things, enable the 
public to access information in the possession of the government and public authorities and 
certain private bodies that have a public character. This Bill proposes that a Commission be 
established to enforce data privacy and security together with other stakeholders, such as the 
Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK). This apparently is what is delaying the process of 
creating data protection legislation. We recommend that the creation of the two pieces of 
legislation (data protection and freedom of information) move in parallel.
One notable aspect of the new licensing framework is that the CCK was abandoning network 
operation licensing based on a ‘beauty contest’ process in favour of open market-based licensing. 
The CCK argued that licensing through the beauty contest process, especially in a liberalised 
market, was “not only unnecessary but undesirable and inconsistent with market dynamics”. The 
problems of using the bidding process were evident in the licensing of rural telecommunications 
operators (RTOs), commercial trunked radio operators (CTROs) and the third GSM operator, which 
were generally a failure. In effect, the CCK was abolishing the “beauty contest” in preference to 
simple issuance of a license if a potential operator meets the requirements, on a first come first 
served basis. For scarce resources like the frequency spectrum, the CCK considers the auction 
process as the only viable, transparent and fair allocation method.
In its post-exclusivity statement in 2004, the CCK announced its intention to implement a unified 
technology-neutral licensing regime. The implementation of this licensing framework was 
considered a good mechanism to harness the opportunities presented by technological 
advancements in ICT and to address the regulatory challenges associated with convergence. 
Under the unified licensing and regulatory model, operators and service providers will be licensed 
under three broad market segments:
• Network Facilities Provider (NFP) – to provide infrastructure system for long distance 
transmission and for local access.
• Applications Service Provider (ASP) – to provide all forms of services to end-users using the 
network services of a facilities provider.
• Contents Services Provider (CSP) – to provide content services such as broadcast (TV & 
Radio) material, and other information services and data processing services, etc.
The unified licensing framework (ULF) permits any form of communications infrastructure to be 
used to provide any type of communications service that an operator or service provider is capable 
of providing. After delays and discussions with the operators and the public, ULF became effective 
from late 2008 after the Ministry of Information and Communication issued new policy guidelines 
through a gazette notice. The guidelines drop the multiple licensing regime, where services were 
grouped on the basis of services and technology. ISPs (Internet Service Providers), for instance, were 
formerly required to obtain a separate licence to offer VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol). The 
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unified licence has, for example, allowed the mobile operators to become the biggest providers of 
Internet services. It has also allowed other service providers, such as local loop operators and 
Internet service providers, to get a new lease of life in previously shrinking businesses. 
Some of the benefits of the ULF are that licensing procedures have been simplified, new 
applications have been developed, and there has been increased penetration and availability of 
mobile internet as well as increased infrastructure investment.
In the more recent past, the government issued five sets of regulations for the sector in March 2010. 
These regulations are: 
• The Kenya Information and Communications (dispute resolution) Regulations. These 
stipulate the power of the commission and the process of resolving disputes between 
consumers and a service provider, two service providers or any other person as may be 
described in the Act. 
• The Kenya Information and Communications (tariff) Regulations to provide a framework for 
the determination of tariffs and tariff structures. They seek: 
• to ensure licensees maintain financial integrity and attract capital;
• to protect interests of investors, consumers and other stakeholders;
• to provide market incentives for licensees to operate efficiently; and
• to promote fair competition.
• The Kenya Information and Communications (compliance monitoring, inspections and 
enforcement) Regulations. These stipulate the CCK’s power in monitoring and enforcement 
of installations and maintenance of communication infrastructure.
• The Kenya Information and Communications (fair competition and equality of treatment) 
Regulations whose purpose is:
• to provide a regulatory framework for the promotion of fair competition and equal 
treatment in the communications sector; and
• to protect against the abuse of market power or other anticompetitive practices within 
the communications sector.
• The Kenya Information and Communications (interconnection and provision of fixed links, 
access and facilities) Regulations to provide guidelines on interconnection. 
The regulations are expected to have an impact in the sector affecting the various players 
differently. The regulations were welcomed by Telkom Kenya, Zain and Essar Telekom (Yu), who 
argued that they would promote fair competition in the industry, level the playing field and benefit 
the consumers. However, Safaricom, the market leader in mobile voice market (close to 80% market 
share measured by subscriber numbers), protested against the regulations claiming that they were 
aimed at the company because it had been successful and that the idea was to curtail its market 
dominance. Specifically, the protests concerned the lack of definition of market segments in the 
communications sector, lack of definition of what constitutes abuse of dominance, lack of clarity on 
the criteria for defining market dominance, and definition on when tariff regulations applied. This 
protest was sustained in the media for quite some time, with Safaricom threatening to go to the 
courts if the regulations were not reviewed or withdrawn. The Minister eventually gave in and in 
May 2010 agreed to review the regulations.
Institutional Arrangements
With the enactment of KCA 1998, the country had created a highly centralised process of policy 
formulation. The key institutions that can influence ICT policy formulation and implementation are 
outlined below:
• Ministry of Information and Communications:In a cabinet reshuffle in 2004, a new ministry 
was created, namely the Ministry of Information and Communications. According to some 
observers, the previous Minister of Transport and Communication had an uneasy 
relationship with the private sector. As was the case with his predecessors, the Permanent 
Secretary’s attention under the old ministry of Transport and Communications tended to 
focus more on the transportation sector than the communications sector. It is this new 
Ministry of Information and Communications that is in charge of national ICT policy 
formulation and which eventually delivered the new national ICT policy, which was 
approved by the Cabinet in January 2006 and came into effect in March 2006.
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• National Communications Secretariat: The National Communications Secretariat (NCS) 
advises the Government of Kenya, through the Ministry of Information and 
Communications, on ICT policy. Although NCS took several years to get started, it is the 
only key organisation with an explicit and legislatively mandated policy function. It is 
expected to pay particular attention to policies which promote the development of 
technological capabilities, deliver social services and foster economic growth, and 
encourage competition and efficiency in the industry, among other goals. 
• Communications Commission of Kenya: The Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) 
is a statutory agency, whose purpose is to license and regulate telecommunications, radio 
communications and postal services in Kenya. The Communications (Amendment) Act 
2009 transformed CCK into the converged regulator. CCK will now regulate information and 
communications services, which means its regulatory menu now includes broadcasting 
services. By the time of writing this report, CCK had not started regulating broadcasting 
services. 
• Appeals Tribunal: The Appeals Tribunal was established for arbitrating in cases where 
disputes arise between the parties under the Act. The members of the Tribunal are 
appointed by the Ministry in Charge of ICT and are responsible to this Ministry. Any dispute 
in the application of the Act by CCK, for example, is referred to the Appeals Tribunal. The 
decision of the Appeals Tribunal can be appealed in the highest court – the Court of 
Appeal. The Tribunal jurisdiction is limited to the interpretation of the spirit of the Kenya 
Communications Act. One of the first cases the Tribunal handled concerned 
interconnection. The decision by CCK on the interconnection dispute between Kencell 
Communications Ltd and TKL was appealed in the Appeals Tribunal. At issue were 
interconnection rates that TKL felt did not cover the cost of call termination. These rates had 
been established when the cellular operators were small. In 2003, the Tribunal delivered a 
judgment revising the interconnection rates between Kencell Communications Ltd and 
Telkom Kenya Ltd in favour of the latter.
• Directorate of E-government: The Directorate of E-government (DEG) was founded in 
March 2004 in the Office of the President (OP), and a Director was appointed in September 
of the same year. According to interviewees, the Cabinet saw the need for ICT and thus 
mandated the creation of this entity. The E-government Directorate is called for as part of 
the structural composition of the E-government strategy. The official purpose of the DEG, 
according to the strategy, is to oversee the implementation of e-government strategy and 
to assist the Government of Kenya to more effectively deliver services to citizens. The E-
government strategy proposes that each ministry should have its own ICT department. 
• Government Information Technology Services (GITS): The predecessor of the Government IT 
Services was the Micro-Information Systems Department (MISD). In 2000, the MISD was 
abolished and GITS created. GITS provides computer services to government ministries and 
departments and some parastatal organisations. GITS writes relevant computer 
applications, updates existing systems, evaluates system design and conducts feasibility 
studies. The agency aims to ensure ICT standards within government organisations. GITS 
remains a technical entity. The head of GITS is at a Director level and reports to the 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance. In 2005, GITS was transferred to the e-
Government Directorate. However, by the time of writing this report, GITS was still reporting 
PS/Finance instead of being an integral part of e-Government Directorate.
• Kenya ICT Board: The Kenya ICT Board (KICTB) was created by a Presidential Order in 2007. 
The functions of the KICTB are to: (a) advise the Government on all relevant matters 
pertaining to the development, co-ordination and promotion of information and 
communications technology industries in the country; (b) promote both locally and 
internationally the opportunities for investment in information and communications 
technology; (c) facilitate and manage information and communications technology 
industrial incubation parks and technology parks together with associated facilities on sites, 
estates and land; (d) appoint agents within and without the country to carry out such 
functions, as it may consider necessary, in accordance with this Order; and (e) carry out any 
other activity that, in the Board’s opinion, will promote and facilitate the development of 
information and communications technology products and services. These functions have 
a huge overlap with those of the National Communications Secretariat, especially with 
respect to advising the government on ICT issues. These overlaps need to be addressed.
• Parliamentary Committee on Energy, Communications and Public Works: This Committee 
provides Parliamentary oversight in one aspect of ICT, communications. 
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• Monopolies and Prices Commission: The Monopolies and Prices Commission Act allows the 
Commissioner to determine matters that may affect competition in the economy, including 
those that involve companies in the telecommunications business. Monopolies established 
by an Act of Parliament are however excluded from the Monopolies and Prices Commission 
(MPC) control. Consequently, the MPC had little effect on telecommunications sector 
exclusivity until June 2004. In the liberalised segment in the Internet provision, MPC has had 
a role to ensure competition and control mergers. In 1999, MPC cleared the take-over of an 
ISP (Net 2000) by another ISP (Africa Online) concurring that the resulting merger did not 
affect market concentration of Internet business. No other telecommunications related 
case has been handled by the Monopolies and Prices Commission.
From the above outline, it is clear that ICT responsibilities are distributed in different arms of the 
government, with little, if any, coordination. The key consequences of having responsibilities in 
many institutions have been lack of coordination and duplication. Some examples are:
• It is not clear who should develop the BPO/ITES policy between the Kenya ICT Board and 
the National Communications Secretariat. 
• The Kenya ICT Board has been implementing some key E-government applications and the 
coordination between the KICTB and DEG in implementing these applications is not clear. 
• The KICTB has been implementing some universal access projects (e.g. the digital villages 
project) and it is not clear how it coordinates with the CCK, which has a universal access 
mandate.
The CCK does not have a formal relationship with the Monopolies and Prices Commission and there 
has not been a mechanism to regulate competition in the industry. The latest attempt by the 
Ministry to introduce five types of regulations outlined earlier is one way of beginning to deal with 
regulation of competition in the industry. However, given the CCK’s poor history of enforcing 
compliance, it would be interesting to watch the CCK’s enforcement of compliance to these 
regulations. Already one of the key players has forced a change to the regulations.2
GATS Commitments
Kenya has, since 1998, made commitments in five areas of telecommunication services:
• fixed telephony;
• mobile telephony;
• value added services;
• internet; and
• audiovisual services.
The specific services committed include telecommunication services except video and audio 
broadcast, voice telephony services, facsimile services, packet swift data transmission services, 
telegraph services, electronic mail, and electronic data interchange (Otieno and Aligula, 2006).
With these commitments, however, there are limitations, especially on market access. These 
limitations include foreign equity limits; public monopoly over basic telecommunications (often for 
specified periods); prohibition of international call back services; the fact that movement of natural 
persons is unbound except for managers and other expert staff; that commercial presence in 
audiovisual services, motion picture and videotape production (except distribution services) is 
unbound; and that cross-border trade for motion picture projection is unbound (WTO, 2006).
The policy reforms embraced in the Kenyan telecommunications sector since 1998/99 largely 
coincided with the country’s commitments in telecommunications under the GATS framework. 
Progress from the GATS’ commitments includes the CCK’s independence from telecommunications 
suppliers and government; the 2010 regulations by the CCK, which safeguard anti-competitive 
practices among others; and the existence of procedures for interconnection negotiations, dispute 
settlement, and for allocation and use of scarce resources. The cost of communication via the 
Internet and fixed and mobile telephony has substantially gone down with liberalisation of the 
sector.
Kenya ICT Sector Performance Review 2009/2010
6
2 Safaricom protested that the regulations were not well formulated and were targeting it as a company. As a 
result, the implementation of the regulations was delayed pending review by international experts.
It is clear that ICT 
responsibilities are 
distributed in 
different arms of the 
government, with 
little, if any, 
coordination.
Competition Issues
Telkom Kenya enjoys a monopoly over fixed telephone services because efforts to license a second 
national operator (SNO) took many years. Even after licensing one (Econet Wireless), there has not 
been a rollout of fixed-line services. In 2005, Econet Wireless received clearance from the High Court 
in Kenya to roll out its mobile phone network, after the court ruled that its 15-year GSM licence had 
been issued properly. This effectively made it the third mobile operator, after the duopoly of 
Safaricom and Zain (formerly Kencell). In January 2008, Essar acquired a 49% stake in Econet 
Wireless International Ltd, which in turn owns a 70% stake in Econet Wireless Kenya. Essar Telecom 
Kenya (formerly Econet Wireless Kenya), started rolling out its mobile network in 2008 under the Yu 
brand. Due to the delay in rolling out, Essar Telecom became the fourth mobile operator after it was 
beaten to third position by Telkom Kenya.
The regulator awarded Telkom Kenya (under the Orange brand) a mobile wireless operator license 
in 2007, which effectively legalised its existing CDMA-based fixed wireless network. The incumbent 
GSM operators had complained that Telkom Kenya's CDMA network was illegal as the company 
had not paid for an operating license that the regulator had considered to be a fixed wireless 
service. Orange rolled out its mobile network in 2008 before Essar Telecom. The launch of Orange 
mobile service by Telkom Kenya followed France Telecom taking a controlling stake in TKL. Orange 
is now the commercial brand for the mobile, broadband and fixed wireless services from Telkom 
Kenya. 
Competition has intensified after the ULF, with the large operators diversifying their services and 
competing in almost all markets. For example, the mobile operators have become the largest ISPs, 
making business very difficult for the smaller ISPs who do not own infrastructure.
Number Portability
Number portability is a feature that enables telecommunication networks to provide users with the 
ability to migrate from one service provider and/or service type to another without changing their 
telephone number. CCK has been holding consultations with the operators and the public since 
the end of the exclusivity period for Telkom Kenya (2004) on modalities of introducing number 
portability in the telecommunications industry3  with a view to ensuring promotion of competition, 
protection of consumers, and fairness and efficiency in this industry. In August 2009, the 
Commission advertised in the media4  that it had completed the first phase of the public 
consultation process. The summary of the issues and the Commission’s views could be accessed at 
the CCK website.5  In the same advertisement, the Commission invited the public to submit 
comments on views expressed by respondents and the suggested way forward before 28th August 
2009. A timetable in the ongoing consultations shows that an independent service provider 
number portability (SPNP) platform operator would be licensed to manage the reference database 
by 31st December, 2009.
From the submission of the operators posted on the CCK website, it is apparent that the process 
could go beyond the tentative timetable. Some issues of concern are the costs of porting to both 
the customer and operator versus the benefits, need for regulations, tariff transparency, and success 
of NP in other jurisdictions. The process of consultation has taken over five years and it will be 
interesting to see how the CCK moves to implement the concept, with the newer operators keen to 
have SPNP implemented and some resistance from the established operators.
Carrier Pre Selection
The carrier selection code for Kenya is (1XX). The CCK issued a new numbering plan in 2002 in 
anticipation of a telecommunications multi-carrier environment. This was necessitated by high 
demand on the existing numbering resources as a result of the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector and the subsequent growth of telecommunications services in the 
country. The plan provided for introduction of short codes in the range of 1xx to facilitate the 
selection of the preferred carriers by subscribers. Further, short codes for essential services are in the 
range of 9xx (e.g. 999 for police) while the cellular mobile subscriber numbers remain at six digits, 
despite the standardisation of access codes for mobile networks to three digits. According to CCK, 
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the subscriber number length for the rest of the country is to gradually change to seven digits 
during modernisation and expansion of switches. This has not yet been implemented.
New Developments in the ICT Sector
The current national ICT policy is the first for the country and was published through a special issue 
of the Kenya Government Gazette (GOK, 2006). The vision in this policy is of “a prosperous ICT-
driven Kenyan society”. Its mission is “to improve the livelihoods of Kenyans by ensuring the 
availability of accessible, efficient, reliable and affordable ICT services”. This policy is currently under 
review given the changes that have taken place in the last four to five years and the changes that 
are anticipated. For example, there is a converged legal and regulatory environment, the undersea 
fibre bandwidth has landed, there is an economic blueprint (GOK, 2008a) that the policy needs to 
align to, and there have been and will be many other national, regional and global changes. The 
National Communications Secretariat was to have a draft policy document by August 2009 that 
was to be subjected to stakeholder consultation. This has not been done. 
The Kenya Vision 2030 represents the blueprint for the country’s development up to year 2030 
(GOK, 2008a). The vision aims to make Kenya “a globally competitive and prosperous nation with a 
high quality of life by 2030”. The vision has three pillars, namely the economic pillar, the social pillar 
and the political pillar. The overall objective of the Kenya Vision 2030 is to realise higher and 
sustainable economic growth in a more equitable environment, accompanied by increased 
employment opportunities. The Vision is to be implemented in five successive Medium-Term Plans 
(MTPs) under the Ministry of Information and Communications, the first of which runs from 2008 to 
2012 (GOK, 2008b). The vision of the ICT sector MTP is that “Kenya becomes a information and 
knowledge based society”. Its mission “is to provide information and communication based 
solutions and ensure the availability of efficient, reliable and affordable information communication 
services countrywide”. The overall sectoral goal of the ICT sector MTP is “to facilitate provision of 
equitable and affordable quality information and communication services countrywide”.
Undersea Cables
Until recently, international bandwidth was largely satellite-based because Kenya did not have an 
undersea optical-fibre cable. However, this changed when The East African Marine Systems (TEAMS) 
and Seacom landed at the Kenyan coast in mid-2009 and became operational before the end of 
that year. Seacom is a private venture while TEAMS is a public-private partnership between the 
Kenyan Government and local operators. The Kenya Government owns 20% of the share of the 
cable. Another undersea fibre, Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy), is expected to land 
in 2010. 
The arrival of the cables heightened consumer expectations with regard to Internet Services. A key 
expectation was an immediate drop in Internet prices for consumers. Quality has improved but 
reduction in the cost of retail (consumer-level) Internet service remains elusive. The average satellite 
bandwidth cost about US$3,000 per Mb/s per month before the undersea cable arrived. This has 
dropped only slightly. 
Initial commercial prices for the Seacom cable bandwidth have been quoted between US$400 to 
US$500 per Mb/s per month. Although the wholesale Internet prices have been reduced slightly, 
the retail prices appear to be stuck at previous satellite costs. Most Internet Service Providers have 
offered hope of lower prices in the future, but have thus far only offered increased bandwidth for 
the same price, and have not reduced entry-level prices. The issue of Internet/broadband tariffs not 
coming down was discussed in the KICTANET forum, with no firm conclusions. At one stage, the 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Communication threatened that the 
government could move in and regulate prices. There is still hope that there will be a significant 
downward trend in these tariffs when the third cable becomes operational later in 2010. 
National Fibre Backbone
The Kenyan Government has invested in building a national fibre backbone, referred to as the 
National Optic Fibre Backbone Infrastructure (NOFBI). The project aims at establishing a national 
public broadband network with Internet Points of Presence (PoPs) in most district headquarters, 
including border towns, in order to attract and stimulate private sector participation in the 
provision of rural telecommunications services. NOFBI is critical in enabling rural areas to access the 
cheaper and faster undersea cable bandwidth. This infrastructure has been completed through 
private contractors and extends to 56 urban and rural towns. A tender had been put out for 
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selection of an operator for the cable infrastructure. At the time of writing this report, the 
Government was in the final stages of evaluation. The plan is to select three operators to operate 
regional segments of the infrastructure.
Universal Service Fund
A universal access study in 2004 recommended the establishment of a universal service fund (USF). 
The Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act of 2009 established a USF to be managed and 
administered by the CCK. The objective of the fund is to facilitate the rapid achievement of national 
policy goals for universal access to information and communication technologies, with particular 
focus on rural residents and people with special needs. In August 2009, the CCK invited 
stakeholders to submit comments before 7th September 2009 on a consultative paper dealing with 
the implementation of USF on its website (http://www.cck.go.ke/current_consultation). It would be 
interesting to see how long it will take the CCK to implement the universal fund now that there is 
an enabling legal framework.
Regional Co-operation on Policy and Regulatory Issues
A regional ICT governance study (Waema, 2005) found that Kenya takes regional issues seriously 
and actively participates in and influences regional ICT discussions, especially in the Community of 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and East African Community (EAC). Kenya has benefited 
extensively from regional ICT models. The regional study also found that the influence of regional 
institutions is only restricted to ICT policy development. Even then, this influence is limited. One of 
the explanations is the existence of multiple ICT policy and programme initiatives, some of which 
are often in competition with each other. Some of these initiatives have their origins in the 
“development partners” funding the initiatives with very little ownership from African governments. 
A second explanation is that regional institutions lack institutional mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with model policies and frameworks as well as to monitor and evaluate 
implementation of ICT policy in member countries. This is made difficult by the fact that member 
states are sovereign states and have no obligation to go by regional policy guidelines. 
A further explanation is that the various countries in the region are at various stages of economic, 
political and social development, making it difficult for member countries to agree upon common 
priorities and therefore to adopt common models or frameworks. Other reasons are that 
participation in meetings and other fora of regional institutions is often dominated by the most 
senior persons in the concerned ministries at the expense of the more junior people who deal with 
matters on a day-to-day basis, and that there is no clear mechanism to coordinate the inputs of the 
various ministries involved in a regional institution’s agenda. 
The regional study further established that regional institutions do not have any significant role in 
ICT policy implementation and evaluation. Although member countries are entrusted with and 
expected to carry out implementation and evaluation of ICT policy, most regional institutions do 
not have mechanisms to track implementation and to gauge the degree of compliance. For Kenya, 
the institutional framework to ensure implementation and monitoring of policy has not been clear. 
Kenya is party to the East African Regulatory, Postal and Telecommunications Organisations 
(EARPTO) agreements.  Details of interconnections among operators in the party states have been 
implemented and the two main operators, Safaricom and Zain, have roaming services within and 
outside the member states in the region. Issues relating to the dominant operator have been 
discussed in EARPTO and the CCK issued regulations in March 2010 where issues of dominant 
operators and guidelines to be followed to ensure a level playing ground are outlined.
Finally, in the last few years, a number of local institutions and groups have come to exert a 
significant influence on ICT policy and regulation. The more notable ones include the 
Telecommunications Services Providers Organisation of Kenya (TESPOK), Kenya ICT Federation (KIF), 
Kenya ICT Policy Action Network (KICTANET) and the Kenya BPO and Call Centre Society (KBPOCCS). 
TESPOK represents the telecommunications service providers in Kenya. It has successfully lobbied 
the government regarding the establishment of the Kenya Internet exchange Point (KIXP) and the 
liberalisation of very small aperture terminals (VSATs). It also encouraged the government to 
establish the Ministry of Information and Communications and helped to set up Internet exchange 
points in other countries in the region. 
KIF is the umbrella body which brings together all private sector organisations with an interest in 
ICT. TESPOK and the Computer Society of Kenya are members of KIF. KIF vigorously lobbied for the 
finalisation of Kenya’s ICT Policy. KICTANET is a civil society organisation comprising a loose network 
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of donors and NGOs. It collected comments from various parts of civil society in Kenya regarding 
the ICT policy and forwarded them to the Ministry of Information and Communication (MOIC) for 
implementation. In general, the three bodies, representing private sector, civil society and donors, 




The market structure in Kenya is competitive and the licensing framework is converged and 
technology-neutral with concentration in fixed and mobile segments. The regulatory framework 
was improved to allow for a technology-neutral and horizontal licensing framework. In 2006, the 
broadcasting and information technology sectors did not have an official regulatory framework. 
There were suggestions then (in the Draft Broadcasting Sector Policy Statement of 2000 and the 
Kenya ICT Policy [2006]) that the CCK should be strengthened to be responsible for regulation of 
broadcasting and ensure quality and compatibility of ICT products and services. All this has 
changed with the passing of the Kenya Communications Amendment Act (2009). 
The process of migrating to the Unified Licensing Regime, a regulatory framework that embraces 
technological convergence and is based on the principle of technology neutrality, started in 2007. 
The first licenses under the framework were issued in July 2008, and by the end of the year, 35 
licenses had been issued. The framework does not distinguish between mobile and fixed services, 
satellite and terrestrial services or data and voice services. The difference in licenses is dependent 
on which layers of the model one operates in. However, a distinction is made between national and 
international services. 
There are six main licences in the ICT market structure (see Appendix 1 for details):
• National Network Facilities Providers;
• International Network Facilities Providers;
• Non-Infrastructure Based Services Providers;
• Terminal Equipment Providers;
• Private Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT); and
• One Time Authorisation.
In essence, this structure provides three levels of operations recognised by the CCK, namely 
network facilities providers, application service providers and content services providers. The 
number of licensees in the three broad areas is determined by the market, with the exception of 
areas where there exist natural limitations such as spectrum availability. The structure allows direct 
inter-connectivity between all network operators. Operators who fall into more than one category 
are expected to obtain applicable licenses for all the categories in which they operate. Cross-
subsidisation between the various licence categories is not allowed and firms with multiple licenses 
are required to structure their operations and submit distinct operational accounting returns to the 
CCK as part of their compliance returns. 
This structure does not interfere with the existing frequency and numbering assignment. Spectrum 
fees are dependent on the amount of spectrum, locality, the coverage of the spectrum (regional, 
localised or national), and offers made in the bidding/evaluation process. Under the new 
framework, private network operators are exempted from annual operating fees, but are required to 
bid in order to access spectrum whenever there are competing needs, and also to pay annual 
spectrum fees based on bandwidth and coverage of their private networks.
With reference to broadcasting, not much has changed in terms of market structure. As per the 
Kenya Communications Amendment Act (2009), broadcasting is still categorised under the 
following market segments:
• Public Broadcasting: Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) remains the public broadcaster 
operating commercially but with a universal service obligation.
• Private Broadcasting: these are private entities licensed to provide broadcasting services on 
a commercial and competitive basis. 
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• Community Broadcasting: these are fully controlled by non-profit agencies to serve 
particular communities, for example special interest groups.
However, the Act streamlined and introduced regulatory provisions whereby the CCK became a 
fully fledged information and communication technology sector regulator which includes 
broadcasting. The CCK is empowered to licence and regulate broadcasting services and promote 
the development of local content in addition to allocating frequencies. The key addition to the law 
is that the CCK has been mandated to set up mechanisms for handling complaints by the public 
against broadcasters. Attempts to regulate the broadcasting sector have so far met with a lot of 
resistance from the media.
Market Share
As at July 2009, there were four licensed and operational mobile GSM operators. These are 
Safaricom, Zain (formally Celtel),6 Orange Kenya and Essar Telecom Kenya (Yu), previously referred to 
as Econet Wireless Kenya. This is a significant improvement from 2006, where only Safricom and 
Celtel (currently Zain) had rolled out their networks. In November 2007, France Telecom acquired 
Orange Kenya (formerly Telkom Kenya) from the Kenyan government. It acquired 55 per cent of the 
company at US$55 million, with an aim to transforming the loss-making former government 
monopoly into a profitable company. Orange Kenya became the country’s third mobile network 
operator in September 2008. 
Essar Telecom Kenya (ETK) is the fourth GSM licensee in Kenya. It operates under the Yu brand and 
offers mobile services. Essar Communications Holdings Limited (ECHL), a subsidiary of India’s Essar 
Global, acquired a 49 percent stake in Econet Wireless International (EWI) in January 2008. Essar had 
400,000 subscribers as at June 2009. The other three operators are available in most parts of the 
country. As at April 2010, Safaricom commanded a market share of 78%, Zain had 14% of the 
market, Orange Kenya had 4%, and Yu had 1%.
The main Internet service operators are the Kenya Data Network, Jamii Telkom, UUNET, 
AccessKenya, Wananchi online, Communication Solutions and AfricaOnline. The seven operators 
command a large share of both individual and corporate subscribers. However, the mobile 
operators have become the largest ISPs with the landing of the undersea bandwidth and the use of 
the unified license. By January 2010, Safaricom had sold more than 3.5 million broadband modems 
and over close to 4 million data modems in total7  (EDGE plus Broadband). One could therefore 
assume that Safaricom had over 4 million Internet users for both EDGE and Broadband, excluding 
the mobile phone Internet users.
Market Investment & Revenue
Safaricom and Zain (formerly Celtel) had a combined investment of KSh44.6 billion and combined 
revenue of KSh46.456 billion during the year 2006/07. This high investment could be attributed to 
investment in infrastructure, which saw the subscribers grow by 66% in the period.  The following 
year, 2007/2008, the combined investment dropped to KSh21.221 billion, while revenue rose to 
KSh57.998 billion. As this is the period during which Safaricom was focusing on privatisation it is 
likely that this is the reason for the reduction in investment.
Table 2 shows mobile revenue and investment from 2005 to 2008. Evidently the annual revenue 
increased substantially, with 2008 registering a 25.22% increase. This is attributed to the increase in 
service availability and subscriptions. However, Average Revenue per User (ARPU)  has been 
declining, with 2008 registering a decline of 12.46%. This fall could be driven by a subscriber 
increase in the low-income group and reduction of tariffs by the mobile operators. According to 
Safaricom financial reports for 2006/07, 2007/08 and 2008/09, the company registered a monthly 
ARPU of KSh799 in March 2007, KSh616 in March 2008 and KSh475 in March 2009.8  This was a 
reduction of 22.9% and 22.88% respectively.
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Table 2: Mobile Revenue and Investment
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Mobile Annual revenue (KShs millions) 28.393 37.627 46.456 57.998 72.625*
% change in Mobile Annual revenue 32.52 23.46 24.85 25.22
 Average Revenue per User – Annual 
(ARPU) (KShs) 
11,151.32 7,148.43 6,328.88 5,110.22 4,473.68
% change in Average Revenue per 
User
-35.90 -11.46 -19.26 -12.46
Mobile annual investment (KShs 
billions) 
28.920 38.670 44.600 21.221 29.365* 
% change in Mobile annual 
investment
33.71 15.33 -52.42 38.38
Source: CCK Database 2009.9 (*) Provisional, Telkom Orange and Econet not included
During the same period, France Telecom announced an investment plan of KSh8 billion (USD 99 
million) in Kenyan subsidiary Orange Kenya, and invested KSh10 billion developing the network’s 
infrastructure in 2009.Kenya’s fourth mobile services provider, Essar Telecom Kenya (Yu), received 
KSh7.5 billion from the Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF) to expand its East 
African operations.
A diversity of alternative revenue sources to compliment voice generated revenue was key for the 
operators.  In line with this, in 2008 Safaricom bought a majority stake in One Communication, 
which has a Wimax (a wireless internet connection) licence. 
According to Safaricom’s 2008/2009 financial report, 
“… revenue increased to KSh70.48bn in the period compared to KSh61.37bn during the same period in 
2008. The increase was driven by voice revenue as the customer base increased during the year. Voice 
revenue increased by 8.5% to KSh58.80bn representing 83.4% of total revenue whilst SMS, M-PESA & 
data revenue increased by 83.0% to KSh9.10bn representing 12.9% of total revenue from 8.1% in the 
prior year. Total M-PESA revenue in the year increased to KSh2.93bn from KSh0.37bn growing to 4.1% of 
total revenue from 0.6% in the previous year. Data revenue increased to KSh1.51bn or 2.1% of total 
revenue from KSh0.34bn or 0.5% of total revenue in the previous year”.
It has been suggested that voice revenue increased due to reduced costs and also numerous cost-
saving promotions. SMS revenue also declined by 9% to reach KSh287,145,378 in June 2008 from 
KSh315,557,601 in June 2007 (CCK, 2008). According to the CCK (2008), on average the tariffs 
charged by operators decreased by between 30% and 50%, depending on the mode of payment 
and tariff plans. Lower end-user tariffs led to the increase of over 25% in incoming and outgoing 
traffic.
Fixed Telephone Network Revenue and Investment. Although the number of fixed-line 
subscribers declined by 1.2%, there was an increase in investment of 279.2% from 2006 to 2007. 
This has also led to revenue growth of 6.6% from 2006 to 2007.  The investment shown in Table 3 
could be attributed to the expansion of the ADLS, which registered high growth in the last three 
years. 
Table 3: Fixed Telephone Network Revenue and Investment
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Fixed Annual Revenue 
(billions) 
20.540 17.657 49.211 52.435 52.435* 
% change in Fixed Annual 
revenue
-14.036 178.71 6.55 0
Fixed Annual Investment 
(billions) 
35.416 12.568 5.533 20.980 20.980* 
% change in Fixed Annual 
Investment
-64.51 -55.98 279.18 0
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report 2008/9)9 (*) Provisional, data incomplete from 
Telkom Kenya (Orange).
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Revenue and Investment in Internet and Data services. Revenue generated in the Internet and data 
services improved over the years and by 2008, the Internet market generated close to KSh2.324 
billion (US$33.2 million, at KSh70) while the data services generated KSh5.046 billion (US$72 million, 
at KSh70). This is an improvement of 5.9% and 1.77% in the Internet and data services respectively 
from 2007 to 2008. At the same time the investment in the Internet sub-sector decreased from 
KSh0.417 billion (US$6.2 million, at KSh67) in 2007 to KSh0.234 billion (US$3.3 million, at KSh70) in 
2008 as shown in Table 4. On the other hand, investment in the data service more than doubled, 
from KSh416 million (US$6.2 million, at KSh67) in 2007 to KSh937 million (US$13.4 million, at KSh70) 
in 2008. This could be attributed to the entry of broadband operators e.g. Safaricom, Wananchi, 
KDN, etc. with better and more affordable offers.
Table 4: Internet and Data services Revenue and Investment
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 Change 
(%)
Total annual revenue from internet 
services (billions) 
- - 2.324 2.460* 5.9%
Total annual revenue from data services 
(billions) 
3.495 4.949 5.046 5.135* 1.77%
Total investment from internet services 
(billions) 
- - 0.417 0.234* -43.88%
Total investment from data services 
(billions) 
- - 0.416 0.937* 125.24%
Source: CCK Database 2009.9 (*) Provisional, data incomplete from all DCNOs and ISPs.
Employment
The telecommunications industry has created significant employment, particularly in the mobile 
sector. However, there was rationalisation of operations, particularly in Telkom Orange and Zain, 
leading to massive retrenchment. Table 5 shows that Safaricom had the highest number of 
employees per line followed by Zain and then Yu. Orange Kenya registered more lines per 
employee in 2009 due to the additional number of lines from Orange Mobile and Orange Wireless 
in addition to the massive retrenchment. 
Table 5: Mobile Operators’ employment trend
Operators 2006 2007 2008 2009
Safaricom employees 800 800 1,000 2,387
Safaricom’s lines per employee 5,375 9,945 11,956 5,597
 Zain employees 600 600 705 564
 Zain’s lines per employee 3,567 4,568 3,888 5,319
Orange Kenya (fixed, mobile and wireless) 
employees
18,000 18,000  - 4,000
 Orange Kenya lines per employee 16 15  - 403
Yu  0  0  0 350
 Yu lines per employee  0 0 0 1,143
Source: Operators annual reports, press releases and media websites 20099 - unavailable data.
The global recession of 2008/9 saw 41 Zain employees retrenched. Orange Telkom retrenched over 
14,000 staff in the last three years as part of its re-engineering and rationalisation process. Safaricom 
has continued to employ, with a staff level of 2,387 as at March 2009. The large increase in 
employment in 2009 for Safaricom can largely be accounted for by the establishment of an in-
house call centre, employing almost 50% of the total employees. Yu was in the process of recruiting 
staff. However, it is noteworthy that some staff who left Zain moved to Yu.
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Access to ICT Services
Fixed Telephone Services
The fixed-line service has continued to perform poorly with a rapid decline over the last decade. 
This is largely attributed to the rapid growth in mobile phone use. The number of fixed fixe 
subscribers has continued to decline from 2006 to 2008 as shown in table Table 6 below At the end 
of December 2008 there were about 250,000 subscribers and the trend, in line with other African 
countries, shows that this will decrease. The Communications Commission of Kenya has attributed 
this mainly to cable vandalism that affected the operations of Telkom Kenya. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggested that the ease of acquiring a wireless (mobile) line made people unwilling to 
endure the long waiting period to be assigned a fixed line. On the other hand, the number of 
customers waiting to be connected to the wireline network has substantially dropped over the 
years from a high of 109,758 in 2003/4 to 8,194 in 2007/8. This could be ascribed to a reduction in 
demand for wireline services as more people move to wireless connections. Other alternatives are 
likely to occur, with voice over IP services from ISPs and others using broadband connections.
Table 6: Fixed Network Subscribers (Cumulative)
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08
Wireline 
Capacity
531 441 51 382 516 993 505 103 512 281
Wireline 
connections
299 225 278 867 293 364 263 122 252 615
% change in 
Wireline 
connections
-6,80 5,20 -10,31 -3,99
Urban 
connections
284 264 264 509 279 079 251 924 246 927
Rural 
connections
14 961 14 358 14 285 11 198 5 688
% Change in 
Rural 
connections
-4,03 -0,51 -21,61 -49,21
Waiters 109 758 93 192 64 618 26 925 8 194
% change in 
Waiters
-15,09 -30,66 -58,33 -69,57
Number of 
business lines




- - - 135 328 123625*
Number of 
payphones
9 273 8 273 7 913 5 805 5210*
Source: CCK 2007/08 Annual report and CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report 2008/9) (*) 
Provisional, data from the fixed network operator (Telkom Kenya).
The number of wire line subscribers has declined over the years with a decline of 10.31% in 2007 
while 2008 registered a decline of 3.99%. It is also worth noting the fall in rural connections in 2007 
and 2008, a reduction of 21.61% and 49.21% respectively. This can be attributed to marketing and 
new innovations by mobile phone operators and increasing increased access from rural areas.
CCK statistics produced between April and August 2009, however, show some positive changes in 
the fixed line in first half of 2009, as shown in Table 7.
Kenya ICT Sector Performance Review 2009/2010
14
The number of wire 
line subscribers has 
declined over the 
years.
Table 7: Fixed line trend, June 2008 to June 2009
Indicator June-08 Sept-08 Dec-08 Mar-09 June-09
Subscribers in urban areas 239,948 239,848 237,142 236,926 240,533
Subscribers in rural areas 9,998 7,583 6,599 7,328 7,439
Number of business lines 131,222 131,145 127,747 128,233 130,185
Number of residential 118,724 116,286 115,994 116,021 117,787
Number of Wireline 
subscribers
249,946 247,431 243,741 244,254 247,972
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report. April to June 2009).
The slight growth of the fixed lines since the beginning of 2009 is seen to be a reflection of the 
revitalisation of Telkom Kenya following its privatisation in 2007. The growth is not confined to 
urban areas, as is demonstrated in Table 6.
The number of public payphones has continued to decrease over the years, registering a total of 
5,210 by the end of 2008 compared to 5,805 by the end of 2007 – a 10.25% reduction. This is lower 
than the previous year, which saw a reduction of 26.64%. This has largely been attributed to 
vandalism and poor connections. Though this reduction poses a threat to Universal Access, 
increased mobile penetration and access to mobile community pay phones have significantly 
increased access to voice services. It is hoped that with the introduction of a Universal Service Fund 
by the Kenya Communications Amendment Act (2009), there will be increased penetration of ICT 
services, especially in the rural areas. 
The introduction of fixed wireless technology increased the total subscriber base in the fixed 
network market. Telkom Kenya launched fixed wireless services based on Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) 2000 technology in the 800MHz frequency band in 2007. Since the CDMA 2000 
devices are similar to the mobile handsets, users have been using the service as a mobile substitute. 
TKL also had the advantage of being exempted from Excise Duty, yet all mobile operators are 
expected to pay the Excise Duty of 10% applied to services offered by operators owning a mobile 
license. Therefore TKL was able to offer fixed mobile services at reduced prices compared to the 
GSM operators. This move attracted opposition from Safaricom and Zain, who argued that Telkom 
Kenya was offering mobile services in the absence of an adequate license. This led to Telkom Kenya 
being issued with a license in 2008 to offer mobile services using CDMA and/or GSM technology to 
comply with the Excise Duty regime applicable to mobile services.
During 2007/2008, Telkom Kenya retired its analogue low capacity links and systems (including 
Instafone Wireless Local Loop System in Nairobi, multi-access systems, single channel radios, Kitale 
Digital Radio Multiple Access System-DRMAS) and returned frequencies to the Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK, 2008).
Fixed Wireless Services (LLOs)
Fixed-network services are offered by Telkom Kenya Limited and two operational Local Loop 
Operators (LLOs); EM Communications (Popote Wireless) and Flashcom. LLOs are small operators 
with regional licenses to complement the fixed fixe services and provide the last mile services. Their 
license limits their operation within limited distance with long distance traffic transmitted through 
the fixed network. The combined subscriber base of the two LLOs registered a decline of 6.3% in 
2008 compared to a 24.69% growth experienced in 2007 as shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Local Loop Subscribers (Popote Wireless and Flashcom)
Indicator Dec 2006 Dec 2007 % change Dec 2008 % change
Total 
Subscribers
8 481 10 575 24,69 9 908 -6,31
Number of 
business lines




- 4 547 - 4 261 -6,29
Source: CCK Annual Report 2007-8 (CCK, 2008).
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This declining trend is expected to reverse once the operators migrate to the Unified Licensing 
Framework, which is technology neutral. A local loop operator that migrates to Network Facilities 
Provider (NFP) tier 3 will be able to interconnect with other service providers and therefore allow 
greater mobility for their customers. 
Despite the decline of the LLO customers, fixed wireless subscribers grew from 418,224 in the 
quarter ending March 2009 to 448,529 in June 2009, representing a 7.2% growth as illustrated in 
figure below.
Figure 1: Fixed wireless subscribers
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report. April to June 2009)
Mobile Telephone Services
In 2007/2008, the CCK assigned frequencies and numbering resources to Telkom Kenya and Econet 
Wireless (Yu) for deployment of GSM mobile networks. The mobile sector has witnessed rapid 
growth, particularly with the licensing of two new operators in 2008, Orange Kenya and Yu, who 
started their operations in September and November 2008 respectively. The mobile operators are 
now targeting lower-income groups and increasing geographic coverage. According to the RIA 
household survey data9  (2007), mobile ownership is not highly dependent on the economic status 
of the subscribers; it has actually become a necessity for many. Already, telephone penetration has 
reached levels that can be achieved only if subscribers are members of households that are below 
the poverty line (assuming phone subscribers are twelve years of age or older). The consequence of 
this has been a gradual reduction in average revenue per user (ARPU).
As Table 9 demonstrates, the mo telephone subscribers have been growing at an increasing rate. 
The slight drop between 2007 to 2008 could be due to lack of accurate data from the mobile 
operator Zain, which may have more subscribers than those is pd in the calculation. By mid- 2009, 
the sector had already registered a 6.4% growth rate, a trend likely to continue.
Table 9: Mobile Subscribers








June 2009 13.36 m 3 m 1 m 0.4m 17.4 6.4%
2008 11.956m 2.741m* 0.4m n/a 16.70 56%
2007 7.956m 2.741m n/a n/a 10.70 66%
2006 4.3m 2.14m n/a n/a 6.44 40%
2005 2.5m 2.1m n/a n/a 4.6 -
Source: Safaricom annual reports and press releases from Zain,10 Orange Kenya and Essar.11 
(*)Likely inaccuracy.
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9 This is sourced from the Research ICT Africa website, http://www.researchictafrica.net/
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The period leading to 2007/08 saw the number of subscribers grow by 55.8%, with a 41.9% increase 
in 2008/09. This increase is supported by an increasing penetration rate for mobile services as 
shown in table 10. It is to be noted that the period had reached 44%, while 83% of the population 
was covered by 2008/2009.
Table 10: Mobile penetration and coverage
Indicator 2005/06 2006 /07 2007/08 2008/09
Mobile Penetration (%) 15.74 21.62 30.51 43.64
Population coverage (%) - - 82 83
Land Coverage (%) - - 31 32
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report 2008/9).
The increase in mobile penetration can be attributed to the competitive effects resulting from the 
increased number of mobile operators, increased mobile coverage and availability of low 
denomination calling cards from both Safaricom (KSh20) and Zain (KSh50). It is also to be noted 
that the number of subscribers for Orange and Yu grew by 1 million and close to half a million 
respectively within their first year of operation.  
There has been an increase in infrastructure sharing among the mobile phone operators. For 
example, Safaricom shares towers with Zain and Orange through reciprocal arrangements. Essar 
Telecom Kenya (Yu) also shares Zain’s towers and base stations.
Broadband Services & Internet
Among the telecommunication services, the Internet has been the least accessible service in the 
country. The low uptake of this service can be attributed partly to lack of infrastructure due to 
reliance on satellite before cables landed in Mombasa, and the limited relevant local content and 
limited PC ownership. Although the CCK had issued 127 licenses to Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
only 50 were operational. The new market structure and unified licensing framework introduced in 
2008 is expected to stimulate growth in the sub-sector. Further, enhancement of the competition 
regulatory framework, as well as operationalisation of the national fibre backbone is expected to 
boost Internet penetration. 
Broadband refers to a new generation of high-speed transmission services which allow users to 
access the Internet at significantly higher speeds than traditional modems. Broadband services had 
been a preserve of the ISPs. However, mobile operators and Local Loop Operators have diversified 
their services to offer broadband services both in offices and homes. 
The CCK assigned Safaricom with spectrum for commercial rollout of 3G services after a successful 
one-year trial period in 2007. The 3G packet-based data network offers a number of advantages 
over the existing circuit-switched methods used for transporting mobile voice and is set to increase 
call volumes and support multi-media data applications. By February 2010, Safaricom had 600 base 
stations (BTSs) with 3G (against 2,100 with Edge) and planned to add another 400 3G BTSs in 
2010/2011.
By the end of 2008, the mobile telephony sector had a total of 392,964 broadband mobile Internet 
users and by June 2009, the number had increased to 1,801,876 (a growth rate of 358.5% as shown 
in the Table 11).
Table 11: Growth of internet subscribers including broadband (Jun 2008–Jun 2009)
Indicator June-08 Sep-08 Dec-08 Mar-09 June-09
Number of leased line 
customers
1,558 1,695 1,809 2,002 2,789
% change 8.8 6.7 10.7 39.3
Number of dial up 
customers
8,897 7,696 7,846* 6,902 7,231
% change -13.5 1.9 -12.0 4.8
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388,199 392,964 392,964 1,674,948 1,801,876




394,950 398,140 398,190 1,704,948 1,814,183
% change 0.81 0.01 328.17 6.41
Total Internet 
subscribers
405,444 407,531 407,845 1,713,852 1,824,203
% change 0.51 0.08 320.22 6.44
Internet users 
(Cumulative)
2,900,205 3,043,442 3,359,552 3,409,896 3,648,406
% change 4.9 10.4 1.5 7.0
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report, April to June 2009).
Mobile data/Internet made the highest contribution to Internet penetration due to the aggressive 
rollout of data services by mobile operators. For example, interviews with key Safaricom personnel 
in February 2010 indicated that the firm had so far sold about 3.5 million data-enabled or 
broadband modems10  and another 250,000 narrowband (EDGE) modems. This makes the total 
number of modems sold by Safaricom alone as 3.7 million. If we assume about two thirds are 
actively being used, Safaricom alone has over 2.5 million active mobile users. 
The RIA household survey data (2007) established that most users obtain access through their place 
of work, training institutions or Internet cafés. The introduction of smart mobile phones and GPRS/
EDGE has meant that a large number of users are beginning to access the Internet over a mobile 
connection, as illustrated earlier. In addition, operators like Jamii Telkom and Telkom Kenya are 
building fibre terrestrial networks in urban areas across Kenya. The availability of these services is 
likely to significantly increase Internet penetration in the country.
International Gateway Bandwidth
The increase in demand for data services led to an increase in international gateway downlink and 
uplink bandwidth between 2006 and 2008. The total international gateway bandwidth increased 
from 174.43Mbps in 2007 to 1,421.15 Mbps in 2008. This represents a growth of 8.9% in 2006, 
200.6% in 2007 and 171% in 2008 as shown in Table 12.
Table 12: International Gateway Bandwidth (Cumulative)
Indicator Dec 2005 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08
International Gateway Downlink Bandwidth 
(Mbps) 
89.89 100.96 379.5 828.31
International Gateway Uplink Bandwidth 
(Mbps) 
70.28 73.47 144.9 592.84 
Total International Gateway Bandwidth 
(Mbps) 
160.17 174.43 524.4 1,421.15 
% Total bandwidth growth 8.9% 200.6% 171%
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report 2008/9).
The bandwidth charges to ISPs have decreased from since 2005his is attributed to increased 
competition after the 22 data carrier operators were licensed as at December 2007. The period 
between June 2008 and June 2009 has recorded a drastic increase in International bandwidth as 
demonstrated in table Table 13. It is not clear ere was a drastic increase by March 2009. This could 
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10 This is how aggressive Safaricom has been in entering the data market after the landing of the undersea 
cable. The other mobile operators have been following suit with all manner of promotional initiatives.
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be due to the hype that preceded the landing of the undersea bandwidth. Since the commercial 
use of the undersea bandwidth started after mid mid-2009, there has been a phenomenal increase 
in total international bandwidth. For example, the educational and research institutions under the 
Kenya Educational Network (KENET) was consuming more than 500 Mbps by the beginning of 
2010, and planned to increase to more than 1 Gbps before the end of the year.
Table 13: International Gateway Bandwidth June 2008–June 2009.(Cumulative)
Indicator June -08 Sep-08 Dec-08 Mar-09 Jun-09
International Gateway Downlink 
Bandwidth (Mbps) 
595.84 823.69 828.31 1,886.4 1,985.75
International Gateway Uplink 
Bandwidth (Mbps) 
313.6 315.44 592.84 714.50 760.80
Total International Gateway 
Bandwidth (Mbps) 
909.44 1,139.13 1,421.15 2,600.90 2,746.55
% Total bandwidth growth 25.3 24.8 83.0 5.6
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report, April to June 2009).
Table 14 shows the bandwidth charges to the ISPs. The percentage reductions have been steady 
over the years with no significant difference, except for 2008 which showed a 30.26% reduction.
Table 14: Broadband bandwidth charges to ISPs
2005 2006 2007 2008
Bandwidth charges for 256kbs 119,000 109,420 99,840 -
% change -8.05 -8.76
Bandwidth charges for 512Kbs 231,200 215,440 199,680 -
% change -6.82 -7.32
Bandwidth charges for 1,024Kbs 455,600 422,800 390,000 272,000
% change -7.20 -7.76 -30.26
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report 2008/9).
Operators have given conflicting information on expected reduction in broadband tariffs after the 
operationalisation of the undersea fibre cable. Operators have often defended their high prices by 
arguing that they will first recover their investment. They have promised improvement in data 
transmission speeds. Data collected from the large operators in February 2010 shows that the 
prices are considerably lower and – 1Mbps guaranteed bandwidth was about US$600 per month 
(at KSh76 to the dollar), down from over US$3,700 per month in September 2009.
Table 15: Commercial broadband bandwidth cost in February 2010









256 38,625 12,500 12,000
512 72,276 23,000 24,000




1 Mbps 3,999 4,500
Source: CCK Database, 2009; operators websites 2010.
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Recent Developments
There have been major developments in the recent past for both terrestrial and submarine cables. 
The telecommunications infrastructure received a major boost with the landing and 
commissioning of the East Africa Submarine Systems (TEAMS) and SEACOM as well as the license 
award to Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) to roll out telecommunication infrastructure 
that will see operators buy excess capacity from the firm.
The CCK has also established policy guidelines on infrastructure sharing in an effort to ease the 
investment burden of new entrants into the market and avoid duplication of resources. The 
initiative was embraced by two mobile operators, Zain and Essar Telecom, their having entered into 
an agreement to share infrastructure.
The government’s move to exempt VAT on all telephones for cellular and wireless networks in the 
2009 budget was a significant development in the telecommunications market too. This move is 
expected to promote affordability, increase penetration and reduce the cost of customer 
acquisition.
There is clear evidence of the effects of the impact of convergence of services and the subsequent 
Unified Licensing Framework (ULF). The announcement by a data firm that they would self-provide 
telecommunication infrastructure to offer broadcasters video and audio transmission service over 
an IP network is indicative of this. The strategy, which fully harnesses technological convergence, is 
expected to significantly reduce the cost of broadcast transmission.
The National Terrestrial Fibre Optic Network (FONN). Three companies – SAGEM, ZTE and 
HUAWEI – were contracted by the government to construct a National Terrestrial Fibre Optic 
National Network (FONN), aimed at providing terrestrial links to major towns and commercial hubs. 
It is also referred to interchangeably as the National Fibre Optic Backbone Infrastructure (NOFBI). 
Over 5,000km of fibre optic cable was laid down all over the country at a cost of US$130m through 
the NOFBI. It is to be operated by Telkom Kenya on behalf of the Government of Kenya. The plan is 
to extend this infrastructure to the borders of neighboring countries like Tanzania, Uganda and 
Ethiopia. This initiative is expected to increase Internet and business communications access in 
both urban and rural Kenya, complementing the undersea cables and ensuring maximum 
utilisation of capacity. In addition, other operators such as Jamii Telkom and Kenya Data Networks 
(KDN) are laying down their own fibre infrastructure across the country.
Submarine Fibre Optic Cables. Two submarine cables, The East African Marine Systems (TEAMS) 
and SEACOM landed in Mombasa in mid 2009 and were operational before the end of that year. 
The Eastern African Submarine Cable System (EASSy) cable landed in mid-2010.
The East African Marine Cable (TEAMS). The East Africa Marine System (TEAMS) Ltd is a KSh6.5 
billion Government of Kenya special purpose vehicle created to lay a fibre-optic sea cable 
connecting the East African region to the world's communications backbone. The 4,500km long 
cable was constructed by Alcatel.  The project is based on a Public Private Partnership (PPP) with 
the shareholding distributed as shown in table 16.
Table 16: TEAMS’ Shareholding
Kenya government (20%) Kenya Data Networks (10%)
Safaricom (22.5%) Wananchi Telecom (5%)
Econet Wireless Kenya ltd (10%) Access Kenya (1.25 %)
Telkom Kenya (22.5 %) Jamii Telecom (3.75%) 
7.5% was not allocated as at 1st August 2009
Source: Ministry of Information and communication, 2009.
TEAMS will buy onward capacities for its cable that ends in Fujairah (United Arab Emirates). The 
TEAMS project was initiated in response to the delays with the EASSy cable.
Seacom. Seacom is a privately funded outfit with Tyco Telecommunications as the contractor for 
the 15,000km long cable. The investors are shown in Table 17. The cable is estimated to cost US$700 
million (KSh56 billion). It has a capacity of 1.28 Terabytes per second. The cable links South Africa, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, India and Europe.
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Table 17: Seacom shareholders
Industrial Promotion Services - an arm of the 
Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development 
(25%)
Convergence Partners (12.5%)
Venfin Limited (25%) Shanduka Group (12.5%)
International Herakles Telecom with (25%)
Source: Seacom website.
The Eastern African Submarine Cable System (EASSy). The Eastern African Submarine Cable System 
(EASSy) project is co-owned by a number of telecommunication companies in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. EASSy was the first initiative proposed to connect countries of eastern and 
southern Africa via a high bandwidth fibre optic cable system to the rest of the world, but has 
experienced a significant delay compared to SEACOM and TEAMS. Alcatel-Lucent is the contractor 
after it won the tender at a cost of US$ 300 million. The project shareholders are shown in table 18.
Table 18: EASSy Shareholders
Sudan: Sudatel Tanzania: Tanzania Telecommunications Company 
Limited 
Djibouti: Djibouti Telecom Madagascar: Telma 
Somalia: Dalkom Mozambique: Telecommunication de Mozambique 
Kenya: Telkom Kenya Pan-African telecom trade association: ATU
South Africa: Telkom SA, Neotel, MTN 
Group 
Source: Eassy Website.
The cable links eight countries covering about 10,000 km. It runs from South Africa to Port Sudan, 
with landing points in six counties along the Indian Ocean, and provides connectivity to at least five 
landlocked countries. 
A summary for the three undersea cables is provided in table 19.
Table 19: Summary of Fibre Optic Cables
SEACOM TEAMS EASSy
Landing Land in Mombasa in July 
2009
Landed in Mombasa in 
June 2009
Landed in early 2010
Proprietors
SEACOM is a fully funded 
private sector project with 
most of the ownership in 
the hands of African 
entrepreneurs.
About 76 per cent of the 
shareholding in the cable is 
African while the remaining 
24 percent is owned by 
international stakeholders.
The project is a joint 
venture between TEAMS 
Ltd, that owns 85 per cent 
(the consortium of 
Kenyan operators), and 
Eitsalat 15 per cent (Dubai 
Telecom operator).
The project, funded by 
the World Bank and the 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa, was 
initiated in January 2003.
Cost and 
capacity
Cost of US$700 million 
(KSh56 billion) for 1.2 Tb/s
15,000km fibre optic cable
4,500km fibre optic cable
Original design capacity 
of 40 Gb/s 
The project increased  
capacity to 1.2 Tb/s at an 
estimated cost of U$94 
million
The estimated cost of 
the cable is U$205m
10,000km fibre optic 
cable along the Eastern 
coast of Africa
Cable capacity not clear 
from existing literature
The expected benefits of the cable are to:
• Link Kenya with business hubs in Europe, South Africa and India;
• Enable transmission of massive data at high speed;
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• Decrease telecommunications costs are expected to go 
• Encourage Intra-African and direct access to worldwide international cable networks;
• Diminish reliance on expensive satellite communication;
• Reduce data costs from US$7000 per megabit of bandwidth to below US$500 per megabit;
• Open up the entire east African region, especially in the business outsourcing industry; and
• Significantly lower bandwidth costs and encourage growth of small business while giving a 
competitive edge to big business in terms of business communications.
E-Applications and Services. Mobile money transfer products have become the latest value-
added services from the mobile operators. Safaricom’s M-Pesa and Zain’s Zap are currently in 
operation.  Telkom Kenya plans to launch its service, Orange Money, while Essar Telecom Kenya (Yu) 
plans to introduce a mobile phone money transfer service in conjunction with Opal Pay. Money 
transfers are not yet a revenue generation stream for the operators according to both Safaricom 
and Zain.
M-Pesa was launched in March 2007, and is mainly used to transfer money, buy airtime and pay 
bills. The distribution network is based on agents who were already present in markets, requiring 
only basic training. Three months after its launch, M-pesa had 400 agents, compared to 450 bank 
branches and 600 ATMs in Kenya. It commanded over 5 million customers and 3,400 agents 
countrywide as at the end of July 2009. M-Pesa is considered one of the best global innovations in 
mobile telephony and has made a huge difference to the unbanked population in Kenya. 
The Ministry of Education has made available the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education and 
Kenya Certificate of Primary Education results via SMS in the last three years. As a result, candidates 
are able to get their results within the same day of their release through ng their registration 
number to a designated code within the same.
Cost of ICT Usage
The cost of ICT services has reduced in the last three years as the uptake has improved. This can be 
attributed to a reduction in end-user tariffs resulting from low termination rates, enhancing 
affordability and increased uptake by a population that was not previously served, and also to the 
entry of more operators in the industry. This has resulted in most subscribers having dual phone 
subscriptions to take advantage of reduced on-net calls. Anecdotal evidence suggests that almost 
10% of subscribers have two phones or SIM cards.
Mobile operators have also had a number of promotions, especially with the increased competition 
in 2008–09  For example, Safaricom offered a free call promotion towards the end of 2008, leading 
to a drastic increase in the local mobile call traffic an eduction in SMS traffic. It is noteworthy that 
this free promotion led to the clogging up of the network and it was almost impossible to get a 
Safaricom to Safaricom call. For a number of business calls, some acquired Zain lines and were 
willing to pay for the service rather than rely on a free service that they could hardly use. 
Nevertheless, they still used their Safaricom lines when they could. 
The reduction in costs has affected the operators’ revenue, with Zain registering an increase in 
customers to its network but a reduction in revenue after the launch of its promotional tariff “Vuka” 
at the end of 2008.
Retail
Fixed Network Services. In the last three years, Telkom Kenya has launched a number of products 
to address customer needs. For example, in 2007, it launched a package dubbed “Corporate Reach” 
targeting big companies, offering subsidised rates at KSh1,000 for 750 minutes per month to fixed-
line office extensions accessed over the subscriber's mobile device. The company launched other 
tariffs including KSh14 for calls to other networks, dubbed “Furaha” tariff that had, in addition, a 
group package called “Shikamoo” for five family members or friends that cost KSh5, and a credit-
sharing scheme called “Pasha.” 
In October 2008, Orange Kenya announced a new initiative that united the fixed-line customers 
with GSM customers. This was promoted under the banner of the “Niaje” tariff.  All Orange Mobile to 
Orange Mobile voice calls were charged at KSh1 per minute. Calls to and between Orange Fixed 
Plus (Telkom Fixed lines) were charged at KSh7 per minute. Calls to non-Orange mobile services 
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were charged at KSh14 per minute. All SMSes across all networks within Kenya were charged at 
KSh1. This was, however, a promotional package.
Table 20 shows a comparison of the tariffs levied by Telkom Wireless with those levied by the two 
operational LLOs for the period 2008/9, before Telkom Wireless reviewed its tariffs in June and did 
away with peak and off-peak differences as the other two local loops operators had. The tariffs for 
Popote wireless and Flashcom were still valid as at July 2009.
Table 20: Local Loop Operators tariffs in 2008/09
Telkom Wireless Tariffs (per sec billing 
in KShs)
Popote Wireless 
(per sec billing in 
KShs)
Flashcom (per 



















Peak  5 6 Same 
network
5.50 7.00 4.00 5.00










19.00 23.00 8.00 9.00
Off Peak 14 7 To mobile 
phones
12.00 14.00 12.00 14.00
Sms 
national
3.50 3.50 Sms national 3.00
2.00
3.00 5.00 5.00
Source: Operators websites, June 2009.
As indicated, the tariffs for Telkom wireless were for 2008 until June 2009. In June 2009, Telkom 
Kenya made pricing changes. Tariffs for calls within the company's network dropped to KSh4, while 
calls made to other networks were reduced to KSh8 per minute from KSh14. Prepaid customers 
paid a rate of KSh4 per minute for on-net calls to Orange Mobile, Orange Fixed Plus and Telkom 
Fixed lines, and KSh8 per minute across networks, all day and all night. This was the lowest tariff on 
the market for both off-net and on-net calls.
Mobile Services. The cost of mobile services has reduced rapidly in the last two years in line with 
the trend in the ICT sector. This is due to increased competition, customer awareness and increased 
mobile services. Competition demanded that operators reduce their costs. In 2008 and 2009, 
increased competition from two new entrants (Orange Kenya and Essar Telecom Kenya (Yu)) and an 
aggressive promotion distorted mobile services pricing. The price war, kicked off by Zain’s “Vuka” 
tariff, offered KSh8 per minute across networks. At the time of the launch of the “‘Vuka’” tariff, 
Safaricom was charging KSh15 per minute for across network calls. Safaricom, reacted by reducing 
its charges to KSh3 per minute from a high of KSh10 per minute within the network, and KSh8 
across networks, on its “Jibambie” tariff promotion that ran in December 2008.   
The KSh14 that Orange Kenya was charging to other networks during its promotion was a 
disservice to its growth since it had low volumes of customers and hence needed to call across 
networks. Given the existence of the “Vuka” tariff by Zain, therefore customers were not adequately 
persuaded to cross over. They have since revised their tariffs as discussed earlier. This is an 
interesting perspective considering that KSh1 for SMSes was the cheapest across all networks. Yet, 
there are many customers who have been locked into Safaricom and Zain due to network 
externalities and other services offered which require them to be registered to the two networks. 
One of these is Safaricom’s M-PESA initiative explained in the next section. On the other hand, Essar 
Telecom Kenya (Yu) launched another promotional package. It had the lowest charges at the end 
of 2008 with a charge of KSh7.50 per minute (billed per second) and KSh2.00 per SMS across all 
networks. The latest mobile entrants had the lowest tariffs in the market as at December 2008, with 
Safaricom average tariffs being KSh17.80, Zain KSh11.56, Telkom Orange KSh9.63 and Yu KSh7.50.
With the high dependency on revenue generated by call charges, price wars posed a threat to the 
industry’s future profitability. The promotional tariffs translated into poor performance on Average 
Revenue per User.
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The average tariffs for the mobile operators from 2004 to 2008 are shown in Table 21. The table 
further illustrates how prices came down in 2008. In one year the charges within network dropped 
by 45% while across networks the drop was by almost 10% (9.37%). The charges to fixed networks 
also dropped by almost 50% (48.7%) while international charges came down by almost a third 
(28.6%).











Charges to same network 20.18 19.23 18.89 16.43 8.98 
% change on same network -4.71 -1.77 -13.0 -45.34
Charges to another mobile network 32.38 27.37 26.69 22.63 13.26 
% change on another network -5.01 -0.68 -4.06 -9.37
Charges to fixed network 28.76 27.51 25.52 22.75 11.67 
% change on fixed network -4.35 -7.23 -10.85 -48.70
International call charges 99.79 99.79 98.25 71.97 43.39 
% change on International calls 0 -1.54 -26.28 -28.58
SMS same network 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.47 3.04 
SMS to another network 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.03 3.69 
International SMS 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Source: CCK Database, 2009 (Communication Statistics Report 2008/9).
This reduction is mainly due to the reaction to the two new mobile operators – enticing 
promotional packages were offered that forced Safaricom and Zain to reduce their tariffs in order to 
retain their subscribers and expand their market share. The international charges also dropped by 
26.28% in 2007 and 28.58% in 2008 compared to a 1.54% drop in 2006. This could be attributed to 
the legalisation of Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) at the end of 2006.
Broadband Services Tariff. Mobile operators, LLOs and some ISPs have been offering broadband 
services. As at June 2009 Orange Telkom had started massive broadband promotions, with the cost 
of Internet modems ranging from zero to KSh5,000 on a prepaid basis, and per minute rates at KSh1 
to KSh3 per Kilobyte of data. Table 22 shows the broadband charges for Safaricom and Zain as at 
May 2009.
Table 22: Safaricom and Zain Broadband Tariffs
















































Broadband Modem, 3,999 and Broadband Router 25,000. Modem. KSh3,999
Source: Safaricom and Zain websites (June 2009).
In June 2009 Zain lowered the cost of its unlimited Internet package service whereby subscribers 
signing up for the service got unlimited Internet for KSh2,995 per month, down from KSh3,999, as 
well as a free USB modem. New subscribers to the service (only accessible to post-paid users) paid a 
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deposit of KSh5,000, down from KSh10,000. However, subscribers were expected to sign up for 
minimum of 12 months. 
Safaricom had also taken a dominant position in the broadband services, with its tariffs as at July 
2009 for both postpaid and prepaid users shown in the table above. From the tariffs, a monthly fee 
of KSh999 on a prepaid basis was sufficient for average Internet users to have full Internet access for 
a month with an investment of KSh3,999 for the modem. 
The LLOs are also offering broadband services at the rates shown in Table 23.
Table 23: LLO Broadband Tariffs (Popote , Flashcom and Telkom Wireless)
































256 kbps 512 kbps 1 Mbps
Unlimited: voice 






Free WiFi connectivity for every 
Livebox









Source: Operators’ websites (June, 2009).
The Tariffs include VAT. Broadband and Internet access are likely to be the drivers for growth of the 
fixed wireless network, which has faced challenges not only in expanding its customer base, but 
also in retaining customers.
Internet service operators have responded to the mobile phones’ and LLOs’ encroachment into 
their traditionally perceived areas by offering broadband packages as bundles for small business, 
large business and the home users. Zuku, a product of Wananchi Online, using WIMAX wireless 
technology, offers bundles for the Small office/Home Office (SOHO) and Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME) markets. Table 24 shows the rates for AfricaOnline, Wananchi Online and Access 
Kenya broadband services.
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Table 24: ISP’s Broadband Tariffs
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Source: Operators’ websites. (June 2009).
As noted, the pricing for the three operators ranges from a maximum of KSh23,198.85 to a 
minimum of KSh2,999 inclusive of VAT depending on the speed and operator specific charges. 
Judging by the pricing, there is a clear attempt to address the needs of the market, ranging from 
large to small businesses. However, the prices are above the broadband tariffs for the mobile 
operators and LLOs. Furthermore, the low bandwidth offered by the operators indicates that a 
scarcity of the resource would be addressed by the fibre optic cables. 
Other Internet Services. In the Internet market, increased competition has led to a reduction in the 
cost of international bandwidth over the years. By the end of 2008, the cost of 1Mbps of bandwidth 
was KSh272,000 per month, down from KSh390,000 in June 2007 as previously shown. By February 
2010, these prices had come down to KSh48,000 per month as indicated earlier. It is anticipated 
that these costs will continue declining with increasing competition and roll out of fibre optic 
infrastructure in the country and with competition in international bandwidth provision.
Interconnection
One of the short-term regulatory requirements recommended to realign call termination was for 
the CCK (also referred to as the Commission) to issue a Determination on Interconnection rates 
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which the Commission issued as Determination No.1 of 2007 on Cost-based Interconnection Rates 
for Fixed and Mobile Telecommunication Networks.11  The Interconnection Determination became 
effective on the 1st March 2007 and is binding to all the fixed and mobile telecommunications 
network operators operating in the Republic of Kenya, superseding all the previous rulings made by 
the CCK on mobile and fixed interconnection rates.
The implementation of the interconnection rates is based on a glide path and therefore requires 
operators to continuously enter into new Interconnection Agreements and submit the same to the 
Commission. Operators are, however, at liberty to negotiate lower interconnection rates subject to 
the capped rates provided in the Determination. The implementation was divided into three 
phases with the first phase starting in March 2007, second phase starting March 2008 and the third 
and final phase starting in March 2009. The cost-based interconnection rates are shown in Table 25.










Mobile Termination 6.28 5.27 4.42 *****
Fixed Termination 
Local termination 1.74 1.65 1.61 1.67 
Single tandem termination from tandem 
exchange
3.23 3.03 2.90 3.01 
Double tandem termination from tandem 
exchange
4.82 4.35 3.61 3.76 
Single tandem termination from local 
exchange*
5.48 4.98 4.89 5.08 
Double tandem termination from local 
exchange*
6.27 5.71 5.59 5.81 
Fixed Transit
Transit local exchange to tandem (single 
tandem)
2.57 2.31 2.27 2.30 
Transit local exchange to tandem (double 
tandem)
3.37 3.05 2.99 3.06 
Tandem to tandem transit 1.08 0.98 0.96 1.01 
Local to local transit (single tandem) 4.86 4.38 4.30 4.35 
Local to local transit (double tandem) 5.66 5.12 5.02 5.10 
Source: CCK 2009.
The first phase was faced with challenges. However, the second and third phases had better 
implementation, with two more players – Orange Kenya and Yu – entering in the market. They 
negotiated and signed agreements with the other operators on the basis of the rates in the second 
phase.
The reduction ensures that interconnection rates in Kenya are in line with the rates forecast using 
the Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) model for an optimal service provider. The Reduction in 
interconnection costs has contributed to the reduction in tariffs between operators, with average 
tariff reductions ranging from 15% for postpaid calls to the same network and 37% for postpaid 
calls to fixed networks. 
During the implementation of the second phase, the market experienced intense wars on tariffs as 
operators introduced differentiated services and promotional offers. Some of the promotional 
offers did not comply with the interconnection guidelines, resulting in complaints of anti-
competitive behaviour in the market. Whereas the current regulations (section 96(1)) clearly compel 
operators to file tariffs, it does not make provisions on how to deal with promotional offers, thereby 
posing a challenge on the conclusion of the complaints.
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The CCK conducted a network cost study on retail and wholesale prices in the Telecommunications 
market in 2006/07.12
Facility Leasing and Sharing. Wananchi online signed a deal with Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company (KPLC) Ltd.13  that will see it take advantage of the fibre laid by KPLC running along the 
electricity lines. Replicating KPLC’s power transmission network gives Wananchi access to the more 
than one million electricity customers and substantially reduces the cost of cable TV transmission, 
which is currently only possible with the expensive infrastructure support involving the digging of 
trenches to lay terrestrial cables. Other operators (e.g. Safaricom) also started signing agreements 
with KPLC to extend their network reach.
Telecommunications Regulatory Environment 
Survey
The Telecommunication Regulatory Environment survey of 2009 was aimed at evaluating the 
perception of key players based on a methodology developed by LIRNEasia.
Data Collection Methodology
The stakeholders were sensitised on this study during the East Africa Internet Governance Forum 
(EAIGF) held in Nairobi from September 7th to 9th 2009. The Kenya RIA team leader made a 
presentation to the participants giving the project background, the scope, and the expectations for 
each of the three questions. At the presentation, participants expressed interest in participating in 
the survey and gave their contact details. Some of the respondents preferred to respond to the 
hard copy questionnaire, which they were given, and their responses were updated in the online 
survey tool.
A list of potential respondents had been prepared before the research started to ensure that there 
was a balance of respondents from the various sectors. The respondents’ were initially classified into 
the following sectors:
• telkom and mobile operators, ; 
• associations, NGOs, public-private partnerships organisations; 
• banks and travel organisations; 
• universities and research institutions; and
• donor organisations and the media. 
These categories were later collapsed into the three broad categories as per the RIA classification. A 
total of 87 potential respondents belonging to the three sectors were purposely selected for the 
survey and a questionnaire sent to them regardless of whether they had filled in the hard copy or 
not. The responses of those who had filled in the hard copy survey tool, were filled in online for 
them. 
The data collection officially started on 7th September and it was closed on the 26th of October.
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The respondents were categorised in three main categories as shown in table 26.
Table 26: Respondent categories
Categories Responses Used 
responses
1.
Stakeholders directly affected by Telecom sector regulation e.g. 




Stakeholders who analyse the sector with broader interest , e.g. 
Financial institutions, Equity Research Analysts, Credit Rating 
Agencies, Telecom consultants, Law firms 
19 19
3.
Stakeholders with an interest in improving the sector to help 
the public e.g. Academics, Research organisations, Journalists, 
Telecom user groups, Civil society, Former members of 
regulatory and other government agencies, Donors, Current 
government employees from organisations related to the 
telecom sector EXCLUDING those in MoIC and the CCK
19 19
Presentation of Results
Fixed-Line Sector Respondents. Responses from the fixed-line sector are presented in Figure 2 
below.
Figure 2: Fixed Line Sector Responses
Please tick the number that best represents the quality of the regulatory environment for each dimension 
of the fixed sector over the past three years. The lower number represents Highly Ineffective and the higher 
number represents Highly Effective. If you feel you do not have sufficient information about a particular 
question, then choose: "I don't have sufficient information to answer this question".
[F1] Market Entry
[F2] Access to Scarce Resources
[F3] Interconnection
[F4] Tariff Regulation
[F5] Regulation of Anti-competitive practices
[F6] Universal Service Obligations (USO)
[F7] Quality of Service (QoS)
0 8 15 23 30
1 - Highly ineffective 2 - Ineffective
3 - Average 4 - Effective
5 - Highly effective I don’t have sufficient information to answer this question
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The following comments were received in relation to the fixed-line sector (quoted verbatim.):
• I appreciate the strides that have been made in the last three years by practitioners in the 
ICT sector since adoption of the PPP Model, I choose not to complain because we have 
taken tremendous steps.
• I would like to suggest tariffs of mobiles calls to be reviewed downwards and also 
interconnection across the other networks to be lowered.
• We have a regulatory environment where we have many operators, yet the market still 
appears like a monopolistic one and in many cases, the consumers are caught between the 
rock and a hard place. For individual consumers, price is the key issue; for the corporate 
consumers, quality and reliability are key issues. 
• Fixed network sector is on the decline and little effort is being done to revive it by the 
regulator. CCK has not taken up its full mandate of enforcing Anti-competitive practices and 
tariff regulation. Consumer protection issues have not been represented adequately
• I have resolved to say average on the above categories since they are neither effective nor 
highly effective.
• The website of CCK is not quickly updated and information is not easy to locate. 
• There is serious quality of service issues in respect of call quality. The number of call fails and 
call drops is high. CCK should make sure that this information is publicly available and 
tracked on a continuous basis. The public should know. The negative economic impact of 
poor service quality is in excess KSh20 billion, which is what consumers pay for poor quality 
services.
• From reports by ISPs and other licensees of CCK (Government), the license fees are 
restrictive and therefore a barrier to market entry for new players. This has resulted in an 
oligopoly and therefore consumer interests such as regulation of anti competitive prices 
and quality of service have not been looked into. 
• Fixed sector is insignificant and therefore whatever framework that CCK may have 
implemented has had no impact.
Obviously some of the comments are misplaced and could apply to other sections.
Mobile Sector Respondents. Responses from the Mobile sector are presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Mobile Sector Responses
Please tick the number that best represents the quality of the regulatory environment for each dimension 
of the mobile sector over the past three years. The lower number represents Highly Ineffective and the 
[M1] Market Entry
[M2] Access to Scarce Resources
[M3] Interconnection
[M4] Tariff Regulation
[M5] Regulation of Anti-competitive practices
[M6] Universal Service Obligations (USO)
[M7] Quality of Service (QoS)
0 8 15 23 30
1 - Highly ineffective 2 - Ineffective
3 - Average 4 - Effective
5 - Highly effective I don’t have sufficient information to answer this question
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higher number represents Highly Effective. If you feel you do not have sufficient information about a 
particular question, then choose: "I don't have sufficient information to answer this question".
The following comments were further received in relation to the Mobile sector (quoted verbatim):
• Considering the uptake of mobile services and the learning curve, I would like to 
recommend the regulator and players in the industry for a sterling job, taking into 
consideration the investments they have made, it has been great. This sector has had a 
profound socio-economic impact on the country.
• Tariffs to be lowered across the board.
• The sector has experienced advanced and innovative services and products but the 
benefits of such investments and profits have not trickled down to the consumers except in 
the case of M-Pesa.
• QoS for voice in the mobile telephony sector has not been addressed adequately. For 
instance Safaricom, which has the largest subscriber base, experiences poor voice quality 
and high call drop rates yet no tangible effort is being done to correct this.
• I still feel that QoS is a challenge on the networks that have many subscriber levels. Call 
dropping being one of the main challenges. On call quality and clarity I think so far good 
measures have been taken.
• On the issue relating to anti-competitive practices, it may have more to do with the fact 
that CCK advised the Government poorly in regards to the definition of a dominant 
operator and their general reluctance over the years to use their discretion to declare 
certain market players as dominant which would lead to certain obligations brought to 
bear in an attempt to make the market more equitable. This serves the purpose of allowing 
the dominant players to play anti-competitive tricks and hide behind the lack of a 
determination as to their dominance.
VANS/ISP Sector Respondents. Responses from the Value Added Network Services (VANS)/
Internet Service Provider (ISP) sector are presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: VANS/ISP Sector Responses
Please tick the number that best represents the quality of the regulatory environment for each dimension 
of the Value Added Network Services (VANS)/Internet Service Provider (ISP) sector over the past three years. 
The lower number represents Highly Ineffective and the higher number represents Highly Effective. If you 
[V1] Market Entry
[V2] Access to Scarce Resources
[V3] Interconnection
[V4] Tariff Regulation
[V5] Regulation of Anti-competitive practices
[V6] Universal Service Obligations (USO)
[V7] Quality of Service (QoS)
0 8 15 23 30
1 - Highly ineffective 2 - Ineffective
3 - Neutral 4 - Average
5 - Highly effective I don’t have suffient information to answer the question
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feel you do not have sufficient information about a particular question, then choose: "I don't have 
sufficient information to answer this question".
The following comments were further received in relation to the VANS/ISP sector (quoted 
verbatim):
• Considering the type of infrastructure that was at their disposal and uptake of their services 
by the market, I commend the ISPs and the regulator for a good job, we couldn’t have 
arrived at our present status without the mistakes we made.
• Internet is still too expensive for the common man. Review requirements for ISPs so as to 
have a number of them offering affordable services.
• Through TESPOK, the operators and service providers have been collaborating in terms of 
policies and regulation. They need to add the consumers voice into their initiatives.
• Internet Access has not been properly opened up to common mwananchi due to limited 
access and high tariffs.
• For ISPs I feel that QoS needs to be defined and bench marked. For example when I 
purchase bandwidth of a specific capacity say 512Kpbs. What I do not get from my ISP is 
the ratio of users on the same link – 1:4, 1:10, etc. So I pay for 512K but during peak times 
the share ratio is so high I do not get to enjoy my service. On VANS I would applaud ZUKU 
for their triple play services which I consider a Value Add. All the cellular operators provide 
Internet services and CCK has no solution to the diverse charging practices.
Interpretation of Results
The respondents were asked to fit in their responses in the following five categories:
• 1 - Highly Ineffective 
• 2 - Ineffective 
• 3 - Average/Neutral 
• 4 - Effective 
• 5 - Highly Effective 
• I don't have sufficient information to answer this question 
The table below summarises the responses in the three sectors. 
Table 27: TRE findings
Dimension Fixed Sector Mobile Sector VANS/ISP sector  
Market Entry Requirement description.  Transparency of licensing. Applicants should know the 
terms, conditions, criteria and length of time needed to reach a decision on their 
application. License conditions and exclusivity issues.
38.6% found the market 
entry in the fixed line 
sector to range between 
highly infective, and 
ineffective. 
36.8% found it to be 
average 
14.1 % found it ranging 
between effective and 
highly effective. 
10.5% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
36.9% found the market 
entry in the mobile 
sector to range between 
highly infective and 
ineffective 
28.1% found it to be 
average 
28.1 % found it ranging 
between effective and 
highly effective
7% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
43.9% found it ranging 
between effective and 
highly effective.
28.1% found it to be 
neutral
15.8% found the market 
entry in the Value Added 
Network Services (VANS)/
Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) sector  to range 
between highly infective 
and ineffective
12.3% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 





Requirement description. Timely, transparent and non-discriminatory access to 
spectrum allocation. Numbering and rights of way. Frequency allocation, 
telephone number allocation and tower location rights.
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Table 27: TRE findings




43.8% found access to 
scarce resources in the 




28.1% found it to be 
average
15.8% found the 
distribution to range 
between effective and 
highly effective
12.3% did not have 
sufficient information to 
answer the question.
38.6% found access to 
scarce resources in the 




38.6% found it to be 
average 
12.3% found the 
distribution to range 
between effective and 
highly effective
10.5% of the 
respondents did not 
have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question.
38.6% found it to be 
neutral
29.8% of the respondents 
found access to scarce 
resources in the VANS/ISP 
sector to range between 
highly ineffective and 
ineffective
17.6% found the 
distribution to range 
between effective and 
highly effective
14% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 




Requirement description. Interconnection with a major operator should be 
ensured at any technically feasible point in the network. Quality of 
interconnection comparable to similar services offered by own network. 
Reasonable rates for interconnection. Unbundling of interconnection. 
Interconnection offered without delay. Sharing of incoming and outgoing IDD 
revenue. Payment for cost of interconnection links and switch interface. Payment 
for cost of technical disruption of interconnection.
40.4% found it average
35.1% of the respondents 
found the 
Interconnection to range 
between highly 
ineffective and effective
17.5% found it ranging 
from effective to highly 
effective
7.0% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question.
42.1% of the 
respondents found the 
Interconnection in the 
mobile sector to range 
between highly 
ineffective and effective
33.3% found it average
17.5% found it ranging 
from effective to highly 
effective
7.0% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
37.5% found it neutral
30.3% of the respondents 
found the Interconnection 
in the VANs/ISP sector to 
range between highly 
ineffective and effective
23.2% found it ranging 
from effective to highly 
effective
8.9% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer the 
question. (One respondent 




Requirement description. Regulation of tariffs charged from consumers.
54% found tariff 




28.1% found it average 
10.5% found it to range 
from effective to highly 
effective
7% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
56.1% found tariff 
regulation in the mobile 
sector to range between 
highly ineffective and 
ineffective 
24.6% found it average
10.5% found it to range 
from effective to highly 
effective
8.8%% of the 
respondents did not 
have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
49.1%  found tariff 
regulation in VANs/ISP 
sector to range between 
highly ineffective and 
ineffective 
26.3% found it average
14% found it ranging from 
effective and highly 
effective
10.5% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer the 
question
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Requirement description. Anti-competitive cross subsidisation. Using information 
obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results. Not making technical 
information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information 
available to competitors on a timely basis. Excessive prices, discrimination and 
predatory low pricing. Refusal to deal with operators and other parties. Vertical 
restraints. Technical disruption of interconnection. Sharing of towers and facilities 
by parent company and subsidiaries in different segments of the market.
50.9% indicated that 
regulation of anti-
competitive practices 
ranged from highly 
ineffective to ineffective
38.6% found it average
7.1% found it ranging 
from effective to highly 
effective
3.5% did not have 
sufficient information to 
answer the question
54.4% indicated that 
regulation of anti-
competitive practices in 
the mobile sector 
ranged from highly 
ineffective to ineffective
28.1% found it average
8.8% found it ranging 
from effective to highly 
effective
8.8 % of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
40.3% indicated that 
regulation of anti-
competitive practices in 
VANs/ISP sector ranged 
from highly ineffective to 
ineffective
29.8% found it neutral
19.3% of the respondents 
found it ranging from 
effective to highly effective
10.5 % did not have 






Requirement description. Administration of the universal service program/fund 
in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and it is 
not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by 
the policymakers.
43.9% of the respondents 






29.8% found USO to be 
average
8.8% ranged from 
effective to highly 
effective
17.5% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
33.4% of the 
respondents indicated 
that the universal service 
obligation in the mobile 
sector ranged between 
highly ineffective and 
ineffective
22.8% found USO to be 
average 
19.3% ranged from 
effective to highly 
effective
17.5% of the 
respondents did not 
have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
50.9% of the respondents 
indicated that the 
universal service 
obligation in the VANS/ISP 
sector ranged between 
highly ineffective and 
ineffective
24.6% found USO to be 
neutral 
8.8% ranged from effective 
to highly effective
15.8% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 




Requirement description. The actual performance of a service with respect to 
what is promised, depending upon the network traffic control mechanisms. 
Specific criteria may be call quality (for mobile and fixed), connection speeds or 
throughput (for broadband)
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Dimension Fixed Sector Mobile Sector VANS/ISP sector  
Quality of 
Service (QoS)
50.9% of the respondents 
indicated that the quality of 
service (QoS) ranged 
between highly ineffective 
and ineffective
33.3% found it to be 
average
10.6% find it ranging from 
effective to highly effective
5.3% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer the 
question
36.8% of the 
respondents indicated 
that the quality of 
service (QoS) in the 




36.8% found it to be 
average
19.3% found it ranging 
from effective to highly 
effective
7% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
42.1% of the 
respondents indicated 
that the quality of 
service (QoS) in the 




38.6% found it to be 
neutral
14% found it ranging 
from effective to highly 
effective
5.3% of the respondents 
did not have sufficient 
information to answer 
the question
The following are some explanations of some of the key observations and findings:
• Licence fees as barriers to entry. Some of the license fees are very high and act as 
barriers of entry to new or small to medium operators. For example, in the mobile sector, 
the 3G license; which has been set at US$25 million. This effectively gave Safaricom 
monopoly over 3G products. The CCK was forced to bring it down to US$10 million after 
complaints from the three of the four operators who had not bought the license. 
• High tariffs. The tariffs have been high largely because of lack of competition; Telkom has 
continued to dominate the fixed-line services while, until 2008, there was a duopoly in the 
mobile services sector. There have been obstacles to regulatory intervention intended to 
bring down tariffs. One of the key ones is the resistance from the dominant mobile 
operator. Indeed it is indeed due resistance that the implementation of the new regulations 
has been suspended. The implementation of all the regulations gazetted would bring 
down tariffs and improve quality of service. The other key obstacle has been the lack of will 
to intervene in regulating tariffs by the regulator.
• Quality of services. The quality of mobile calls has been low. While the CCK is said to have 
purchased a quality of service monitoring system called Q-voice in 2007, at a cost of Kshs 50 
million (US$750 000), the derived benefits from its use have not been evident.  This could 
partly due to the lack in the past of a structured way frame of for comers relating with the 
regulator in the past. the last two years, a directorate of consumer affairs was created to 
deal with consumer issues, a sign that quality of service is a priority for the regulator.  
• Dominant operators. Dominant operators have not been properly regulated despite the 
existence of regulatory mechanisms in the existing regulations. The implementation of the 
new regulations that tried to regulate dominance were suspended after the dominant 
mobile operator complained.
• Universal services. A universal access strategy was developed in 2006 but this was never 
implemented. The amended Communications (Amendment) Act 2009 allowed for the 
establishment of a Universal service SendFund. Under the Act, a levy shall be charged by 
the Commission on the licensees for purposes of the Universal Service Fund. This has 
received mixed reactions and even resistance from some of the operators. For example, a 
common argument by the large mobile operators is that they are meeting the universal 
service obligations by providing services in rural areas. However, according to CCK sector 
statistics (March 2010), the mobile population coverage is 84.5% while the land coverage is 
34%. This is a clear indication that the operators have focused on densely populated parts 
of the country, leaving some parts uncovered. Another reason for apprehension is that 
most operators are not sure how the fund will be managed and do not trust the CCK as a 
manager for of these funds. At moment, there is a consultancy firm that is carrying out 
access gaps and perhaps they will create a strategy.
Towards Evidence-based ICT Policy and Regulation  
35
Conclusions and Recommendations for Policy 
Actions
Kenya has made progress in the telecommunication sector since the 2007 review. This includes the 
establishment and implementation of the interconnection guidelines in 2007, the strategic 
positioning of the ICT sector in Kenya Vision 2030, the passing of the Kenya Communications 
(Amendment) Act, 2009, and the introduction of new regulations in 2010 that address the 
interconnection issues, anti-competitive practices and dominance issues. The landing of three 
marine fibre cables at the coast of Mombasa in 2009 and 2010 will have an impact on pricing and 
lead to the introduction of more value added services all benefiting the consumers.
Table 28 concludes issues discussed and recommends policy actions. 
Table 28: Summary of findings and recommendations for policy
Issue Conclusions from the Study Recommended Policy 
Actions
ICT policy
The environment has changed significantly 
since the ICT policy was formally approved 
in 2006.
The implementation of the existing policy 
was not well coordinated. 
Review the national ICT policy 
Create detailed plan for the new 
policy implementation that is 
aligned to Vision 2030.
Legal 
framework
The Kenya Communications (Amendment) 
Act, 2009, does not address all aspects of e-
transactions, is not harmonised with the 
East African neighbours.
Review the Kenya 
Communications (Amendment) 
Act, 2009, and harmonise with the 
East African neighbours.




There is overlap in the roles of the National 
Communication Secretariat and the Kenya 
ICT Board with respect to advising the 
government on ICT matters. 
Review the institutional 






The national fibre infrastructure (NOFBI) is 
ready but has not been put into operation.
The national fibre infrastructure does not 
have countrywide reach
USO obligations are highly ineffective.
Operationalise NOFBI 
immediately to make broadband 
services available to many rural 
areas.
Sensitise the public on the impact 
of ICT services on their lives
Plan and implement Universal 
Access in consultation with 




Number portability has been under 
discussion since the end of the exclusivity 
period in 2004 and little progress has been 
made
Customers feel captured by the operators 
and find it difficult to move across 
networks
Implement number portability in 
the next one year.
ICT funding
ICT funding has not been adequate and 
sustainable.
Allocate adequate funding for ICT 
from internal resources (not 
donor funds).
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The landing of three 
marine fibre cables at 
the coast of 
Mombasa in 2009 
and 2010 will have 
an impact on pricing.
Table 28: Summary of findings and recommendations for policy






Dominant operators often practice anti-
competitive behaviour and abuse their 
powers of dominance. Hopefully the Fair 
Competition and Equality of Treatment 
Regulations published in March 2010 will 
address the issues of dominant operators 
and abuse of dominance. Dispute 
resolution regulations offer guidelines on 
how disputes will be resolved between all 
the players.
Regulator has been ineffective in 
regulating quality of services. However this 
may start happening with the Compliance 
Monitoring, Inspections and Enforcement 
regulations, which among other things aim 
at ensuring provision of modern, 
qualitative, affordable and readily available 
communications systems and services in 
Kenya.
Broadcasting sub-sector has resisted 
regulation by CCK.
Strengthen CCK to have adequate 
power and more autonomy to 
make decisions.
CCK to faithfully enforce 
regulations on quality of services 
and anti-competitive behaviour.
Spectrum
Access to spectrum is ineffective (not 
transparent, etc.)
CCK to implement transparent 
and non-discriminatory methods 
to allocate spectrum
Tariff regulation
End-user Internet/broadband tariffs are still 
too high in comparison to average 
incomes.
Tariff regulation was found to be highly 
ineffective. However the CCK has issued 
tariff regulations that will address issues 
related to tariffs. Further interconnection 
and provision of Fixed links, Access and 
Facilities regulations will address pending 
interconnection issues resulting in better 
tariff regulations. 
CCK to faithfully enforce 
regulations and implement other 
mechanisms to regulate tariffs 
and specifically bring down 
Internet and broadband tariffs.
Data
Accurate data is not readily available
Information on the CCK’s website is 
inadequate and not up-to-date.
Strengthen the data unit in CCK 
and have it work closely with the 
Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics (KNBS).
Strengthen KNBS and mandate it 
to collect ICT data and provide 
timely and accurate statistics.
e-services and 
information
Limited e-services and information to 
businesses and the public by the 
government.
Implement key applications that 
provide information and services 
to the public and businesses.
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